




Firms‘ resource base is one of the determinants of their capacity to innovate. When firms’ inter-
nal base of financial, intangible or technical resources is not sufficient to realize innovation pro-
jects, resources provided by other stakeholders can mitigate innovation constraints. This cumu-
lative dissertation intends to shed light on innovation-related collaborations and interactions of 
three specific kinds of actors. The first article investigates the role innovation plays for investors 
when screening and evaluating potential investment targets and explains to which extent the in-
vestors’ behavior re-orients towards the implementation of innovation-pushing measures once 
being invested. Also, the second article refers to the interaction between investors and innovati-
ve firms: Subsequent to a derivation of an industry-specific business model pattern, the second 
article analyzes whether and how financing of new and innovative digital health ventures differ 
between Europe and USA. Adopting a single case study approach, the third article focuses on the 
interaction between corporate accelerators and innovative firms and identifies shortcomings of 
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“An innovation is a change in market or society. It produces a greater yield for the 
user, greater wealth-producing capacity for society, higher value or greater 
satisfaction. The test of an innovation is always what it does for the user.” 
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The term innovation commonly describes things that are new, feature-rich, and, in some 
cases, breakthrough (Christensen, 2019). However, innovation itself is a crucial 
necessity for firms, investors, and entire economies (Audretsch, 1995; Bartelsman, 
Haltiwanger and Scarpetta, 2004; Engel and Keilbach, 2007; Hellmann and Puri, 2000). 
By vigorously following the process of innovation, economies have the opportunity to 
accelerate and enhance prosperity (Solow, 1957). In this cumulative dissertation, I 
intend to focus on innovation and the corresponding actors involved.  
There are many different definitions and classifications of innovation available in 
literature (e.g. Schumpeter, 1942; Freeman, 1990; Koberg et al., 2003; Garcia and 
Calantone, 2002). For this dissertation, a rather broad definition outlined by the OECD 
is used describing innovation as (OECD, 2005): 
“(…) the implementation of a new or significantly improved product (good or 
service), or process, a new marketing method, or a new organizational method 
in business practices, workplace organization or external relations” 
From an economic perspective, primarily three types of innovations exist: market-
creating, sustaining, and efficiency-increasing innovation (Christensen, 2019a). While 
sustaining innovations primarily target on product (or service) enhancements of goods 
who are already on the market, efficiency-increasing innovations are intended to 
increase firms’ input and output ratio (Christensen, 2019a). In contrast, market-creating 
innovations are more: By rethinking products and services in novel ways (i.e. Uber, 
Airbnb), they result in product revolutions (Utterback, 1994, Patrakosol and Olson, 
2007; Christensen, 2019b) and could create completely new markets. In this cumulative 
dissertation, all three types of innovation are adressed. 
2 Theoretical background of dissertation 
Figure 1 illustrates the theoretical background of this dissertation. It shows the linkage 
between resources and firm’s capacity to innovate (left side), lists various actors 




foster innovation (center) and depicts the influence of context (right side). All three 
topics are outlined in the following. 
 
Own illustration following Kostopoulos, Spanos, and Prastacos (2002) and Autio et al. (2014)  
Firm’s capacity to innovate 
Firms are heterogeneous bundles of tangible and intangible resources (Penrose, 1959; 
Wernerfelt, 1984; Peteraf, 1993; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996). Resources are 
assets that are semi-permanently tied to firms (Maijoor and Witteloostuijn, 1996; 
Wernerfelt, 1984). Resources comprise financial and physical (tangible), as well as 
technological, human, organizational and other (intangible) assets used by companies in 
order to develop, manufacture and supply products and services to customers (Barney, 
1991). Following the resource-based logic, organizational resources and capabilities 
affect the outcome of innovation projects and, thus, a firm’s capacity for innovation. 
Within this perspective, firms’ internal resources are inputs utilized for the generation 
of innovative outputs or – in other words, forms of strategic competitive advantage 
(Barney, 1991; Kostopoulos, Spanos, and Prastacos, 2002).  
Actors in innovation-related interaction schemes 
Internal resource bases of firms are often not sufficiently large to realize potential 
innovation projects (Terziovski, 2010). Consequently, besides financial, also non-





















 Policy Makers 
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Interactions between innovative firm and actors 




case, different forms of collaborations, partnerships or interactions between innovative 
firms and other stakeholders can arise in order to extend firms’ internal resource bases 
(Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995). The majority of these collaborations are complex and 
the landscapes of stakeholders involved is diversified. Aside from the key driver of 
innovation, embodied by the innovative firm with the plan to pursue an innovative idea, 
stakeholders in innovation-related collaborations for example include investors, 
universities, policy-makers, consultants, customers, suppliers, intermediaries and others 
(Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995). In the following, the term actor(s) is used to aggregate 
these stakeholders.  
Arising collaborations between innovative firms and external actors are diverse and 
comprise for example venture capital financings by investors, research and development 
collaborations with universities, joint ventures with competitors or licensing agreements 
with firms from other industries. In the following, the term interaction is used to 
aggregate all forms of collaborations, partnerships and other types of innovation-related 
cooperations between innovative firms and external actors. These interactions are 
cooperative relationships (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996) driven by the logic of a 
specific, innovation-related resource need of an innovative firm, which can be satisfied 
by an external actor.  
Influence of context 
As all human action, also actors’ interactions as well as firms’ innovation activity occur 
embedded in a context: a context regulates what people, teams, firms or whole 
institutions “get to see, what choices they are likely to make, and what the outcomes of 
those choices are likely to be” (Autio et al., 2014). Following this logic, context not only 
influences firms’ innovation activity but also innovation-related interactions between 
actors as it regulates origin, forms, functioning and outcomes of processes (Isenberg, 
2010). In literature, there are several studies available systematically analyzing the 
context firms are embedded in (for a review, see Zahra et al., 2014). In these studies, 
context is separated into distinct dimensions. Among others, essential dimensions of 




technological, the social, the political as well as the economic and financial context 
(Autio et al., 2014). 
Industry and Technology context 
Innovation has the power to disrupt industries. However, the chance to do so is directly 
connected with the maturity of an industry. Abernathy and Utterback (1978) claim that 
in early stage of an industry life cycle, entrepreneurial activity is most likely to happen. 
In a mature phase, established industry’s “structural conditions and resource 
munificence may exercise salient influence” on the execution of innovation activity 
(Autio et al., 2014) and impede the success of innovative products, services or business 
models (Anderson and Tushman, 1990; Acs and Audretsch, 1988).  
Directly embedded in the industrial context is the technological context (Obschonka et 
al., 2012). The technological context determines the need of an industry for innovation 
and is defined “by the architectural attributes of the technology around which the 
innovation activity takes place” (Autio et al., 2014): Is the current status quo of a 
technology already solving industries’ problems in a satisfactory way, then, a slightly 
better technological approach or innovative solution does not exhibit the same potential 
to disrupt as if the current technology standard is ineffective or inefficient. In this case, 
innovative activity of a firm, i.e. in form of a new, more effective technological solution 
has significant higher chances for being adopted by the market (Thomas and Autio, 
2012; Garud, Jain, and Tuertscher, 2008). 
Social context 
Network and the sharing of expertise or knowledge is crucial for innovation activity 
(Leyden, Link, and Siegel, 2014). The more expertise is shared within a firm, or 
exchanged and traded between actors (i.e. between firm and customers, universities, 
suppliers, investors or other partners), the better innovation could take place (Hoangand 
Antoncic, 2003; Dubini and Aldrich, 1991). Soft factors as uncertainty avoidance (Lim 
and Park, 2013; Efrat, 2014), indulgence (Griffith and Rubera, 2014) or power distance 
(Puia, and Ofori-Dankwa, 2013; Lim and Park, 2013) affect innovation activity as they 





Also policy action is able to facilitate innovation activity and interaction of actors (Autio 
et al., 2014; Zahra and Wright, 2011; Audretsch, Grilo, and Thurik, 2007). The 
opportunity to raise regional, national or international R&D grants can enhance firm’s 
internal base of financial resources which could be directly used for the execution of 
innovation projects (Link and Scott, 2010). In addition, also tax regulations, i.e. the 
national handling of loss carried forward can affect cash flows of innovative firms and 
thus, firm’s financial capacities to launch innovation projects. In addition, tax and legal 
regulations for venture capital or private equity funds raising capital can indirectly affect 
national innovation activity as the raised capital can flow into firms who externally raise 
financial resources in order to finance innovation projects. Other legal factors as rules 
regarding competition with former employers after leaving (Marx, Strumsky, and 
Fleming, 2009) as well as IP protection rights (Autio and Acs, 2010) can also have an 
impact on innovation. Furthermore, the national level of bureaucracy determines how 
easily start-ups could be founded. 
Economic and financial context 
Furthermore and most important, innovation activities and actor interactions are 
influenced by a macroeconomic and thus, financial context (Hoskisson et al., 2013). In 
the global economic crisis, completely developed innovative products were not further 
commercialized, launched innovation projects were stopped, and planned innovation 
projects were cancelled, because organizations primarily needed to fight for survival. 
This means, that the economic well-being can decide whether established firms are able 
to conduct innovation projects on top of their common business or, speaking about start-
ups, whether young firms can find external financial funds from private equity and 
venture capital funds (Welter, 2011). Also policy of central banks can turn out as a 
crucial driver for innovation, particularly if instruments as key interest rates or asset 







Meta context: Temporal context 
All mentioned dimensions of context share one condition: Progress. Industries, 
technologies, societies, organizations etc. – they are not static, but continuously 
developing and thus, move over time. Consequently, another dimension of context needs 
to be considered: the temporal context (Autio et al., 2014). Industries evolve from 
nascent to growth, maturity, and decrease. Technologies are getting better from year to 
year, current standards are challenged or even replaced. Societies change over 
generations, influenced by globalization, technologies or occurrences. Organizations 
grow with the consequence that owners (and their risk appetite), compliance systems 
and governance change (Wright et al., 2013). Finally, also macroeconomic status quo 
continuously evolves. All in all, none of the distinct dimensions of context may be 
considered as static but as continuously developing. 
In conclusion, context, as the sum of several dimensions (Autio et al. 2014), affects not 
only firms’ innovation activities, but also innovation-related interactions between actors 
in direct and indirect ways. 
3 Purpose and focus of dissertation 
As outlined, innovation-related interactions between actors are established when firms’ 
internal bases of resources are not sufficient large to (efficiently) realize innovation 
projects (Kostopoulos, Spanos, and Prastacos, 2002). In this case, external actors are 
approached by innovative firms in order to receive external financial, intangible, 
technical and other resources to enhance firms’ capacity to innovate.  
Arising innovation-related interactions between actors are complex and characterized 
by many different intentions and goals of the actors involved. Commonly, each actor is 
incentivized by individual goals defined within the interaction. For example, venture 
capital funds provide money to innovative firms in order to receive risk-appropriate 
returns (Kortum and Lerner, 2000; Ford and Nelsen, 2014; Gornall and Strebulaev, 
2015). Policy makers and governments facilitate conditions or providing R&D grants 
for start-ups in order to enhance national innovation culture and enable economic 
growth. Innovation-related cooperations between national competitors might emerge to 




interaction-related goals and intentions do not only tend to differ between different types 
of actors, but can also vary significantly within one group of actors: Following a 
primarily strategic driven approach, some corporate venture capital funds are 
exclusively searching for start-ups acting in the field of the mother corporation, others 
are primarily money-driven investment vehicles that primarily seek for the highest 
expected monetary return.  
Furthermore, as outlined, occurring interactions are context-dependent (Wright et al., 
2013). The specific context is manifold; besides economic and financial factors also 
industry-specific, social and political conditions affect the individual interaction (Auto 
et al., 2014). 
Summarized, innovation-related interactions between actors are influenced by a wide 
set of variables leading to a high complexity as many factors need to be considered on 
various levels: Besides firm-specific challenges in evaluating external needs, actor-
specific intentions, goals as well as the mesh of affecting context dimensions, in which 
the individual interaction occurs, matter. 
By adopting a primarily qualitative-driven research design in the three articles of this 
dissertation, I address this high complexity. As stated by Eisenhardt (1989), qualitative 
data can yield deep insights into the phenomenon under review by considering causal 
relationships, complex patterns and context-specific factors.  
Thus, this cumulative dissertation adopts a highly focused, diametrical single-paper 
design in order to research individual intentions, strategies and environments of specific 
actors involved. The three articles of this cumulative dissertation are not in a direct link 
to each other, but focus on various kinds of innovation-related actor interactions as 








Focus on interaction of three specific actors 
This cumulative dissertation focuses on the following three specific actors, whose 
interactions directly affects firms’ innovation output: 
(1) Innovative firms: Key drivers of innovation processes are firms who are 
responsible for the execution of the individual innovation projects. Since 
innovation projects often exceed firms’ internal base of (financial and non-
financial) resources, innovative firms often require support from outside.  
 
(2) Investors: Investors provide capital to innovative firms enabling them to realize 
capital-intensive innovation projects. Investors’ primarily goal is to be 
compensated with a high return on their investment in the future. 
 
(3) Corporate accelerators: By supplying mainly intangible resources to young firms, 
corporate accelerators support innovative firms by providing non-financial 
resources such as advice, mentoring, infrastructure and network. In contrast to 
investors, their intended return on invested resources is not a (direct) cash 
payback, but to enhance corporate’s innovation.  
The articles of this cumulative dissertation investigate individual-specific perspectives 
of these actors in regards to innovation (Kahn et al., 2006; Daneels and Kleinschmidt, 





Structure of dissertation 
Figure 4 depicts the structure of this dissertation: 
 
Own illustration 
Interaction: Investors and innovative firms 
Investments by investors (e.g. venture capital and private equity funds) into innovative 
firms are transactions increasing firms’ financial resource base (Manigart and 
Beuselinck, 2001). These resources are highly needed as most innovation projects are 
capital-intensive (Kortum and Lerner, 2000; Ford and Nelsen, 2014; Gornall and 
Strebulaev, 2015; Proksch et al., 2017). The allocation of these resources, along with 
(non-financial) measures to protect, accelerate and support the growth of the portfolio 
company (Colombo and Grilli, 2009; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009; Gompers et al., 
2016; Hellmann and Puri, 2002), is the primary activity of investors. After screening the 
market and selecting companies that exhibit the highest chance to succeed, investors 
provide innovative firms one of the most crucial resource for innovation (Lee et al., 
2001; Manigart and Beuselinck, 2001; Colombo and Grilli, 2010): capital.  
Interaction: Corporate Accelerators and innovative firms 
Corporate accelerators provide (young) firms mainly intangible resources (“high value 
added services” (Pauwels et al., 2016)) like coaching and mentoring services, product 
development support, network, infrastructure and office space (Bauer, Obwegeser, and 
Avdagic, 2016; Colombo and Delmastro, 2002; Gassmann and Becker, 2006). 




enhanced through the collaboration with a corporate accelerator (Shrader and Siegel, 
2007), another crucial intangible resource for firm’s capacity to innovate is provided. 
Hence, (young) firms extend their internal resource base of intangible resources by 
cooperating with corporate accelerators in order to enable innovation (Achtleitner and 
Engel, 2001a; Seidel 2001). Simultaneously, corporate accelerators consider innovative 





4 Overview and summaries of dissertation articles 
An overview of the three articles of this cumulative dissertation regarding authorship, 
contribution and publication status is provided in table 1. 
Table 1: Overview dissertation – Titles, authorship, contribution and publication status 
Article Title Authorship Contribution 
Publication 
status 
     
First 
article 
The role of 
innovation in 












Main responsibility for project 
management, literature review, 
presentation and discussion of 
results 
 
Research design, data access, 








     
Second 
article 
Venture Capital in 







of Digital Health 
Start-ups in USA 
and Europe 
Cornelius Maas Single author 
 





     
Third 
article 
Start-ups in a 
corporate 
accelerator:  
what is satisfying, 
what is relevant 










derivation and presentation of 
results 
 
Data access, data collection and 
data analysis were collaborative 
Accepted, soon to 








In the following, each article is summarized by describing the research stream, the 





Summary first article: The Role of Innovation in Venture Capital and 
Private Equity Investments in Different Investment Phases 
Introduction and Motivation 
Innovation could be a value-lever, for economies (Solow, 1957), for investments (Engel 
and Keilbach, 2007; Hellmann and Puri, 2000; Peneder, 2010), and also on a firm-
specific level. Focusing on the latter, innovation (i.e. in form of innovative products or 
services) could enable companies to differentiate against competitors and enhance their 
market shares. However, innovation projects are often characterized by long-term 
development cycles and high capital intensity. Equity investment funds as venture 
capital or private equity funds provide capital for small- and medium-sized companies 
to realize capital-intensive innovation projects that exceed the companies’ own 
individual financing capacities (Kortum and Lerner, 2000; Ford and Nelsen, 2014; 
Gornall and Strebulaev, 2015; Proksch et al., 2016). But what’s their view on innovation 
and how do they support their portfolio companies once they have invested the capital? 
Building on the perception that innovation drives both companies’ and equity 
investment funds’ investment performance, the first articles of this cumulative 
dissertation specifically address the effects of the investor–investee relationship in terms 
of innovation. 
 
Conversation & Authors: 
The collaboration of investors and their portfolio companies in the context of innovation 
is already examined by several scholars. The body of literature in this area could be 
separated into venture capital on one side and private equity studies on the other. Besides 
quantitative analyses examining the direct impact of an equity investment funds 
involvement on the portfolio companies’ innovation performance, there are several 
qualitative studies focusing on the post-investment phase and the services of equity 
investment funds (coming on top to the invested capital) to their portfolio companies. 
The following list shows various articles representing the conversation we entered with 
our analysis: 
 Amess, K., Stiebale, J., and Wright, M. (2016). The Impact of Private Equity on 




 Bertoni, F., and Tykvová, T. (2015). Does Governmental Venture Capital Spur 
Invention and Innovation? Evidence from Young European Biotech Companies. 
Research Policy 44 (4): 925–935.  
 Breuer, W., and Pinkwart, A. (2018). Venture Capital and private Equity 
Investments as Key determinants of economic development. Journal of Business 
Economics 88 (3–4): 319-324. 
 Engel, D., and Keilbach, M.. (2007). Firm-Level Implications of Early Stage 
Venture Capital Investment - an Empirical Investigation. Journal of Empirical 
Finance 14 (2): 150–167. 
 Faria, A. P., and Barbosa, N. (2014). Does Venture Capital Really Foster 
Innovation? Economics Letters 122 (2): 129–131.  
 Gompers, P., Kaplan, S. N., and Mukharlyamov V. (2016). What Do Private 
Equity Firms Say They Do? Journal of Financial Economics 121 (3): 449–476.  
 Kortum, S., and Lerner J. (2000). Assessing the Contribution of Venture Capital 
to Innovation. The RAND Journal of Economics 31 (4): 674–692.  
 Le Nadant, A.-L., and Perfreau, F. (2015). LBOs’ Effects on Innovation. 
Evidence from France. International Management 19 (3): 184–200. 
 Link, A. N., Ruhm, C. J., and Siegel, D. S. (2014). Private Equity and the 
Innovation Strategies of Entrepreneurial Firms: Empirical Evidence from the 
Small Business Innovation Research Program. Managerial and Decision 
Economics 35 (2): 103–113.  
 Tykvová, T. (2018). Venture Capital and Private Equity Financing. An Overview 
of Recent Literature and an Agenda for Future Research. Journal of Business 
Economics 88 (3–4): 325–362.  
 
Research Questions & Methodology: 
While past literature already offers insights to the synergetic collaborative relationship 
between equity investment funds and small- and medium-sized companies, these articles 
have focused mainly on post-transaction implications in areas of financing, governance, 
and operations (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009; Gompers et al., 2016; Gompers, Kaplan, 




companies specifically in terms of innovation, was not in the focus of research yet 
(Gompers, Kaplan, and Mukharlyamov, 2016; Tykvová, 2018). In addition, literature 
lacks evidence on the question how innovation is perceived by equity investment funds 
and how its role differs between various equity investment fund types and their 
individual investment strategies. Thus, the first article of this cumulative dissertation 
focuses on these topics and analyzes the perceptions and strategies of four equity 
investment fund types regarding innovation (Ughetto, 2010), as well as the types’ 
individual impact and influence on the innovation process in their portfolio companies. 
We analyzed the following research questions in our study: 
 
(1) What are the differences and similarities between various equity investment fund 
types with regard to strategic innovation orientation, methodology, and 
expertise? 
(2) On which specific type of innovation the various equity investment funds are 
focusing? 
(3) How do equity investment funds interpret their role once they have invested in a 
company (act in terms of supporting innovation behavior in their portfolio 
companies)? 
For this study, we chose a qualitative research approach and interviewed 30 German 
equity investment fund professionals. We distinguish four types of equity investment 
funds: venture capital funds (VCs), corporate VC (CVCs), private equity funds (PEs), 
and family offices (FOs).  Based on a chronologically ordered interview guide following 
the standard investment cycle of equity investment funds (screening, selecting, 
investing, managing), we asked the investment professionals to describe their general 
approach and method relating to that respective phase. We continued to ask more 
specific questions relating to the role of innovation within the individual phase of the 
investment process. Our interviews lasted on average 34.4 min and resulted in 6.3 pages 
of transcript per interview. Based on this, we screened data for relevant statements 
(Gioia, Corley, and Hamilton, 2013) and were able to derive results concerning the 





Main Findings:  
Results suggest a pronounced discrepancy between a high perceived significance of 
innovation in the general investment strategy (pre-investment phase) of equity 
investment funds and relatively few implemented innovation pushing measures once a 
firm is in the portfolio (post-investment phase). Broken down on the various types of 
equity investment funds, our findings indicate that private equity investment funds have 
a less-pronounced innovation approach in their investment strategy compared to the 
other equity investment fund types as venture capital funds, corporate venture capital 
funds and family offices stating a high relevance of innovation in their investment 
strategy. Concerning the translation of innovation approaches into specific supporting 
measures to portfolio companies we found that venture capital and corporate venture 
capital firms transfer their innovation focus also in direct execution of innovation-
pushing measures aimed at their portfolio companies. However, VCs are more rigorous 
in this context than their CVC competitors. Specific measures to support portfolio 
companies in terms of innovation include creations of industry expert advisory boards, 
incentive programs for innovation-related projects, scientific additions to management 





Summary second article: Venture Capital in the Digital Health 
Industry - Analyzing and Comparing Funding Environment and 
Business Models of Digital Health Start-ups in USA and Europe 
Introduction and Motivation: 
Start-ups are one of the key driving sources for innovation and thus, for the digital 
revolution. By exhibiting flexibility, dynamic structures and high operating speed on top 
of innovative business ideas, they often outperform corporates suffering from 
organizational inertia (Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Hill and Rothaermel, 2003). As 
scaling-up commercialize innovative business ideas require a broad basis of financial 
resources (Kortum and Lerner, 2000; Hogan and Hutson, 2005), venture capital 
investors, providing capital to start-ups, play an important role in the innovation 
commercialization process. One industry, awakening late to digitalization, is the 
healthcare sector (Steinhubl, Muse, and Topol, 2015; Schweitzer and Synowiec, 2012). 
Considering the large potential of digital health innovations (Murray et al., 2016), this 
late development is of high interest. In order to better understand this phenomenon, this 
study focuses on the digital health start-up sector and evaluates how the funding 
situation of start-ups in this industry looks like. Based on a five-fold categorization 
pattern of digital health business models, it further analyzes if and how funding 
situations differ between the various categories. In addition, also exit transaction values 
within the digital health sector are covered in the study and serve as basis for the 
evaluation of venture capital funds’ investment multiples in this market. 
Conversation & Authors: 
The body of digital health literature is continuously growing. Past studies mainly address 
the potential of digital health technologies to enhance processes as well as therapy 
outcomes in healthcare. In addition, several articles examined which factors counteract 
against digital health innovations.  The second article entered the conversation 
represented by the following articles: 





 Albach, H., Meffert, H., Pinkwart, A., Reichwald, R., and Eiff, W. V. (2016). 
Boundaryless hospital. Springer Verlag, Berlin. 
 Balicer, R. D., and Afek, A. (2017). Digital health nation: Israel's global big data 
innovation hub. The Lancet, 389(10088), 2451-2453 
 Barello, S., Triberti, S., Graffigna, G., Libreri, C., Serino, S., Hibbard, J., and 
Riva, G. (2016). eHealth for patient engagement: a systematic review. Frontiers 
in psychology, 6, 2013 
 Eysenbach, G., and Jadad, A. R. (2001). Evidence-based patient choice and 
consumer health informatics in the Internet age. Journal of medical Internet 
research, 3(2) 
 Jacobs, R. J., Lou, J. Q., Ownby, R. L., and Caballero, J. (2016). A systematic 
review of eHealth interventions to improve health literacy. Health informatics 
journal, 22(2), 81-98. 
 Li, J., Talaei-Khoei, A., Seale, H., Ray, P., and MacIntyre, C. R. (2013). Health 
care provider adoption of eHealth: systematic literature review. Interactive 
journal of medical research, 2(1).  
 Mettler, T., and Eurich, M. (2012). A “design-pattern”-based approach for 
analyzing e-health business models. Health Policy and Technology, 1(2), 77-85  
 Murray, E., Hekler, E. B., Andersson, G., Collins, L. M., Doherty, A., Hollis, C. 
& Wyatt, J. C. (2016). Evaluating digital health interventions: key questions and 
approaches. 
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Hendrix, R. M., and Seydel, E. R. (2011). Why business modeling is crucial in 





Research Questions & Methodology: 
Literature until now does not offer an appropriate categorization pattern for clustering 
digital health business models. Thus, the second article of this cumulative dissertation 
seeks to fill this gap and provides a five-fold categorization pattern being simultaneously 
the basis for a subsequent analysis of (local) funding volumes, exit transactions and 
venture capital investment multiples in the digital health sector. Hence, the portfolio of 
research questions in the digital health sector (Murray et al., 2016) is extended by the 
following questions: 
(1) How look a categorization pattern for the digital health sector like? Into which 
categories the current digital health start-up landscape could be separated? 
(2) How does the specific distribution of business models look in the defined digital 
health categories? What about the funding situation for digital health start-ups? 
Are there any differences between the various categories? 
(3) Which categories are the most successful considering exit transaction values and 
investment multiples of venture capital investors? Are there differences between 
the various categories within the digital health sector?  
 
The second article of this cumulative dissertation combines a qualitative and a 
quantitative research approach. Based on a sample of 481 digital health start-ups, located 
in Europe and USA, a five-fold categorization pattern for the digital health business 
models was developed. Afterwards, each company of the sample was assigned to one of 
the derived main and sub categories of the categorization pattern. In addition, 
information in terms of financing volumes and exit transactions were individually 
collected. For the US-based firms, information was obtained from Crunchbase, 
European data were hand-collected via visiting websites and by evaluating press 
releases. Finally, data were quantitatively tested (ANOVA and t-test) to examine if 
funding volumes, exit transactions values and investment multiples of venture capital 






Main Findings:  
Results of the category assignment reveal a clear B2B focus in the digital health start-
up landscape, whereby most of business models focus on solutions for professional 
players as hospitals or other health provider institutions. Furthermore, findings clearly 
indicate a significant gap between Europe and USA for digital health start-ups in terms 
of received financing. Results of the ANOVA F-test confirm considerable heterogeneity 
between the various main categories in terms of funding volumes. There was a 
significant effect on the individual funding volume depending on the specific main 
category belonging at the p<.05 level [F (4.472) = 2.72, p = 0.027]. These results are 
backed by another t-test targeting the difference in terms of funding volume for the two 
distinct business model approaches B2B and B2C. There was a significant difference in 
the scores for B2B (M= 31.2, SD= 65.7) and B2C (M=17.5, SD= 53.8) conditions; 
t(305)=2.470, p=0.007. In conclusion, results could be interpreted as an indicator that 
venture capital funds expect substantially higher chances for their invested capital in 
B2B business models rather than in B2C business models. Exit transactions values 
resemble funding volume data and express also a significant contrast between Europe 
and USA. In total, only 9% of exits in sample took place in Europe. Concerning 
investment multiples of venture capital investors (=exit transaction value divided by 
funding volume), mean differences between the B2B and B2C groups were not 
statistically proven in another t-test as there was no significant difference in the scores 
of B2B (M= 54.87, SD= 245.08) and B2C (M=20.09, SD= 37.09) conditions; 





Summary third article: Start-ups in a Corporate Accelerator: What is 
Satisfying, What is Relevant and What can Corporates Improve? 
Introduction and Motivation 
Intended to create an outside-in open innovation process (Weiblen and Chesbrough, 
2015), many corporates have set up corporate accelerator programs in the last years. 
Being limited to a duration of several months, these initiatives are typically 
characterized by fixed-term, cohort-based programs for start-ups including an equity 
funding by the accelerator as well as mentorship and other educational components for 
the participants. Based on the fact, that many corporate accelerator programs recently 
failed to achieve their primary goal - to nurture innovations from entrepreneurial young 
businesses and transfer these innovations to the parent company (Kohler, 2016; Bauer, 
Obwegeser, and Avdagic, 2016) - many initiatives adapted their program design 
(Gimmy et al., 2017), merged with others accelerators or shut down. What are the 
reasons for this development?  
Conversation & Authors: 
The field of corporate accelerator research is still very nascent. Current studies mainly 
focus on providing a first understanding of the appearance of corporate accelerator by 
establishing definitions, describing program design characteristics as well as deriving 
objectives of these initiatives. In the following, several articles are listed representing 
the conversation we entered in our research project. 
 Bauer, S., Obwegeser, N., and Avdagic, Z. (2016). Corporate Accelerators: 
Transferring Technology Innovation to Incumbent Companies. In MCIS (p. 57). 
 Cohen, S. G. (2013). What Do Accelerators Do? Insights from Incubators and 
Angels. Innovations: Technology, Governance, Globalization, 8 (3-4), 19-25. 
 Hausberg, J. P., and Korreck, S. (2018). Business incubators and accelerators: a 
co-citation analysis-based, systematic literature review. The Journal of 
Technology Transfer, 1-26. 
 Kanbach, D. K., and Stubner, S. (2016). Corporate accelerators as recent form 
of start-up engagement: The what, the why, and the how. Journal of Applied 




 Kohler, T. (2016). Corporate accelerators: Building bridges between 
corporations and start-ups. Business Horizons,59 (3), 347-357. 
 Pauwels, Charlotte, Clarysse, Bart; Wright, Mike, and van Hove, Jonas (2016). 
Understanding a new generation incubation model. The accelerator. In: 
Technovation 50-51, S. 13–24.  
Concluding, the current body of literature fails to provide insights into the perspective 
of corporate accelerator participants - leaving their evaluations of the resources and 
services provided by the corporate accelerators unobserved and thus, the development 
in the corporate accelerator landscape unrecognized. 
Research Questions & Methodology: 
As we did not identify any study on success factors and shortcomings of corporate 
accelerator programs, we decided to focus on this topic by setting-up an empirical study. 
Investigating Telefonica’s corporate accelerator Wayra, one of the longest active 
corporate accelerator programs globally, we focused on the following research questions 
in our article: 
(1) Which program characteristics are crucial for start-ups participating a corporate 
accelerator program - and which are not?  
(2) What are the driving forces leading to satisfaction and dissatisfaction of corporate 
accelerator participants?  
(3) Which are specific shortcomings within crucial program areas?  
 
Since little is known about crucial success factors of corporate accelerators, we decided 
for an explorative qualitative, single-site case study approach (Yin, 2017). Thus, we 
conducted 20 interviews with CEOs and founders of start-ups participating Wayra’s 
corporate accelerator program. By adopting the Gioia approach in the subsequent data 
analysis (Gioia, 2012), we moved from specific observations to a more generalized view 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967) after gathering information from the participants concerning 






Main Findings:  
Based on the evaluation of the gathered codings, we identified the following corporate 
accelerator parameter as crucial shortcoming areas: collaboration with parent company, 
coaching/mentoring as well as extern network (i.e. investors). Participants especially 
criticized complex decision-making processes and laggard speed within the parent 
company Telefonica. Many decisions was stalled by contact persons balking to go into 
risk when collaborating with a start-up. Furthermore, many participants stated the 
impression of an unclear strategy of the parent company for the corporate accelerator 
program. Regarding the coaching and mentoring offer, besides a mixed quality of 
coaches and an imbalance of coaching contents, primarily a lack of in-depth challenging 
of the business model was animadverted. Concerning the external network, participants 
expressed that the investors mediated by the corporate accelerator were primarily late-
stage investors and thus, not the right partner due to the fact that most of the participants 
were still in a seed phase. In conclusion, the majority of the identified shortcomings are 
linked to people and ineffective processes within the collaboration between the start-ups 




The three articles of this cumulative dissertations are following. The original formatting 






5 First article: The Role of Innovation in Venture Capital and 
Private Equity Investments in Different Investment Phases 
Cornelius Maas, Patrick Steinhagen, Dorian Proksch, Andreas Pinkwart 
Abstract: Innovation is an important value lever, especially within small 
and medium-sized companies. However, little research has examined its 
influence within the investment process of equity investment funds – a 
surprising circumstance since innovation could increase an investment’s 
value. This study provides insights into equity investment funds’ 
perspective on innovation throughout the various phases of the investment 
process. We conducted in-depth interviews with investment professionals 
from 30 German-based equity investment funds. Our results show that 
innovation’s importance depends on the strategic orientation of the equity 
investment fund type. In addition, our study provides an overview of the 
criteria, methods, and mechanisms equity investment funds use to support 
innovation. We show that the emphasis of many equity investment funds on 
innovation during the identification of investment targets is not reflected in 
the measures the fund later employs to support innovation processes within 
the portfolio company. This scarcity indicates potential for equity 
investment funds to be more actively involved in the supervision and 
management of innovation activities of their portfolio companies. 
Keywords: Venture capital; corporate venture capital; private equity; 
family offices; innovation; investment strategy 
 
The full text of this article was left out due to copyright reasons. It was published in 
Venture Capital: An International Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance (pp. 1-22) on 5th 





6 Second article: Venture Capital in the Digital Health Industry: 
Analyzing and Comparing Funding Environment and Business 
Models of Digital Health Start-ups in USA and Europe 
Cornelius Maas 
Deutsche Bank Chair of Innovation Management and Entrepreneurship, HHL Leipzig 
Graduate School of Management, Leipzig, Germany 
Cornelius Maas (Corresponding author):  
HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management, Jahnallee 59, 04109 Leipzig, Germany, 
cornelius.maas@hhl.de, +49 1512 2685007 
Cornelius Maas: Cornelius Maas completed his Bachelor’s degree in International 
Management at the University of Applied Sciences Ansbach in 2011. In the same year, 
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investment manager, he completed his Master’s degree (Master of Business 
Administration) at the University of Applied Sciences HFH in 2016. In May 2017, he 
joined HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management, where he is currently a PhD 
candidate at the Stiftungsfonds Deutsche Bank Chair of Innovation Management and 
Entrepreneurship. His research interests are based on his job experience and include 
venture capital and private equity financing as well as other forms of collaboration 




Venture Capital in the Digital Health Industry: Analyzing and Comparing 
Funding Environment and Business Models of Digital Health Start-ups in 
USA and Europe 
Abstract: The digital health start-up landscape is dynamically emerging. 
But how the status quo within this sector looks like? Building-up on sample 
comprising 481 digital health start-ups, this study conceptualizes, examines 
and analyses the digital health industry by deriving an appropriate 
categorization pattern, providing insights about the current distribution of 
business models, and gathering information about venture capital funding 
and exit transactions in the regions Europe and USA. Based on a five-fold 
categorization approach, the results of this study show a clear B2B business 
model focus within the sector. Furthermore, it demonstrates a significant 
gap between Europe and USA concerning the local venture capital funding 
situation for digital health start-ups. By amalgamating funding and exit 
transactions values, this study furthermore indicates that the digital health 
sector could be interpreted as a highly attractive sector to invest for venture 
capital investors due to high achievable investment multiples.  
Keywords: Venture capital; digital health; start-ups; business models, 






Over the last years, digitalization changed whole industries. Sectors as retail, media, or 
finance reveal how digitalization could revolutionize whole market structures. However, 
there are also industries awakening late to digitalization. Especially the healthcare sector 
is particularly lagging. In this market, digitalization still needs to proof its potential and 
sustainability (Steinhubl, Muse, and Topol, 2015; Schweitzer and Synowiec, 2012).  
Start-ups are one of the key driving sources for digitalization. Bringing flexibility, 
dynamic structures and high operating speed to the table, start-ups often outperform 
corporates which often suffer from organizational inertia (Hannan and Freeman, 1977; 
Hill and Rothaermel, 2003) and are therefore struggling to deliver digital innovation. 
However, start-ups are less competitive to corporates concerning financial resources 
needed to commercialize innovative digital business models (Kortum and Lerner, 2000; 
Hogan and Hutson, 2005).  
Venture capital investors provide financing resources to start-ups enabling them to 
realize their business plans (Peneder, 2010; Drover et al., 2017; Maas et al., 2018). By 
the symbiosis of start-ups and venture capital investors, market shares of established 
corporates could be attacked and adopted  (Timmons and Bygrave, 1986; Hellmann and 
Puri, 2000; Lerner, 2002) – as examples like Airbnb or Uber show. But what about start-
ups in digital health and their individual funding situations?  
Based on a sample consisting of 481 digital health start-ups, this study focuses on the 
digital health start-up sector. Besides an examination on how business models could be 
categorized, an analysis is conducted to systematically investigate the funding situation 
of start-ups in this specific industry.  
Both topics are of high relevance. The former, since there is no comprehensive 
categorization pattern for digital health business models in literature available yet. The 
latter, since the innovative products and services of digital health start-ups exhibit the 
potential to significantly improve healthcare. Besides the chance to gain higher 
efficiency and efficacy (Murray et al., 2016) in healthcare processes (leading to 




consumers (“making the knowledge bases of medicine and personal electronic records 
accessible to consumers” (Eysenbach, 2001)), the largest potential of digital health 
innovations is to increase the therapy quality. In other words, innovative products of 
digital health start-ups are able to result in a better therapy outcome for patients (Balicer 
and Afek, 2017) what means at the end, to save lives. To achieve this, digital health 
start-ups need to build-up on a sufficient basis of financial resources – in particular 
considering the fact that, in the healthcare market, expensive clinical trails are often 
needed before innovations are adopted by users (Murray et al., 2016). As in many cases, 
the capacity of young companies with regards to financial resources could not cover the 
capital actually needed (Kortum and Lerner, 2000; Proksch et al., 2016), venture capital 
investors (who provide these additional financial resources) play an important role for 
digital health start-ups – and indirectly for the society as well.  
As venture capital firms are primarily targeting on high returns on their investment when 
they exit a company (Cumming, Fleming, and Schwienbacher, 2006; Schwienbacher, 
2008), finally, also this topic should be covered in the subsequent analysis by examining 
digital health exit transaction values of venture capital investors. 
Summarized, this empirical study aims to enhance the body of literature for the digital 
health by focusing on the following key questions: 
(1) How look a categorization pattern for the digital health sector like? Into which 
categories the current digital health start-up landscape could be separated? 
(2) How does the specific distribution of business models look in the defined digital 
health categories? What about the funding situation for digital health start-ups? 
Are there any differences between the various categories? 
(3) Which categories are the most successful considering exit transaction values and 
investment multiples of venture capital investors? Are there differences between 
the various categories within the digital health sector? 
For the sake of clarity, in this study, the term digital health should be interpreted in a 
broader sense and covers both, the terms eHealth as well as mHealth. Thus, the most 




(2001) serves as a basic indication on which kind of start-ups and business models this 
study is focusing: 
e-health [digital health] is an emerging field in the intersection of medical 
informatics, public health and business, referring to health services and 
information delivered or enhanced through the Internet and related technologies. 
In a broader sense, the term characterizes not only a technical development, but 
also a state-of-mind, a way of thinking, an attitude, and a commitment for 
networked, global thinking, to improve health care locally, regionally, and 
worldwide by using information and communication technology. 
In other words, this article is based on a rather broad interpretation of the term digital 
health and concludes any type of business models which are supported by a digital 
technology and target the healthcare sector – independent whether the applied 
technology within the business model is sensor-, software-, smartphone-, web-, or cloud-
based. 
The structure of the article is as follows: First, it focuses on literature related to the 
digital health sector. Then it clarifies the research design, methodology and data. In 
section 4, results of the research approach are presented. This article concludes with 
discussion, implications, limitations and suggestions for further research. 
 
2. Digital Health Literature 
The body of digital health literature is continuously growing. However, no study was 
identified exclusively drawing on venture capital fundings of digital health start-ups and 
their business models. Past contributions mainly targeted digital health by taking a 
higher-level, clinical, ethical or political perspective. Nonetheless, these findings are 
relevant to understanding the surge of digital health start-ups in past years. Hence, a 
short overview of relevant academic digital health articles is provided. 
2.1 Opportunities of digital health technologies 
Digital health technologies exhibit the potential for a sustainable improvement of the 




Murray et al. (2016). In their study, they emphasize the potential of digital health 
interventions to enhance “effectiveness, efficiency, accessibility, safety, and 
personalization” in the healthcare sector. Steinhubl, Muse, and Topol (2015) examine 
the rise of digital technologies in the healthcare sector and identify that the key drivers 
for the rise of these technologies are the amalgamation of wearable (smartphone) 
sensors, point-of-care diagnostics, real-time data and intelligent decision-supporting 
software algorithms enabling a nearly unlimited, cross-border usability of such tools. In 
addition, factors as improved access for patients, higher quality of therapy, shorter time 
cycles (Schweitzer and Synowiec, 2012) enabled by digital health technologies are 
outlined in literature. Furthermore, also reductions of inefficiencies in the healthcare 
delivery on one side, and opportunities to significantly enhance personalization in 
therapy (Balicer and Afek, 2017) on the other, are important potentials of digital health 
technologies. Nonetheless, their path is also bothered by challenges (Steinhubl, Muse, 
and Topol, 2015) and faces counteracting factors. 
2.2 Obstacles and challenges for digital health business models 
Aspects as the lack of fitting infrastructures between involved stakeholders (Van 
Limburg et al., 2011), the missing patients’ engagement (Barello, 2016) and health 
literacy (Jacobs et al., 2016), enormous financial, regulatory and security hurdles 
(Steinhubl, Muse, and Topol, 2015; Schweitzer and Synowiec, 2012) are addressed in 
literature as conditions leading to a struggling implementation of digital health tools. 
Mettler and Eurich (2012) mention that many digital health enterprises are lacking a 
“clear value propositions to patients” and fail to exhibit a “sustainable profit generation 
formula”.  In a 93-paper compromising literature review, Li et al. (2013) draw on the 
critical influential factors for success or failure of digital health tools. They conclude 
that medical doctors’ acceptance of digital health tools are the “key driving force” for 
the success of these technologies in the market. To achieve physicians’ acceptance for 
digital health technologies, van Limburg et al. (2011), suggest they “should focuses 
more on the context” and call for a “value-driven dialogue” involving all important 
stakeholders in the sector. Also other authors as van Gemert-Pijnen (2011) refer to the 
necessity of “a fresh way of thinking” in order to achieve a bigger impact of digital 




not only the clinical evidence due to medical effectiveness and cost effectiveness, but 
also stable deliveries, a precise implementation, and especially the health economic side 
are crucial. Drawing on health economics as well, Van Gemert-Pijnen et al. (2011) state 
that digital health business models “often disregards the interdependencies between 
technology, human characteristics, and the socioeconomic environment” leading to a 
“low impact in health care practices“.  Also Schweitzer and Synowiec (2012) refer to 
financial questions and claim there is “little evidence” for digital health technologies 
“to whether the expected benefits and savings can be actualized on a large scale”.  
2.3 Clinical and ethical perspective on digital health technologies 
Taking a more clinical perspective, Batra et al. (2017) conducted a systematic review of 
published literature on digital health technologies addressing patients suffering from 
mental illness. For gaining an appropriate overview, they clustered the distinct digital 
health technologies in apps, digital medicine, digital personal health records, and 
electronic pill container, whereby apps represented the largest share of these 
technologies. Drawing on the question of short-term vs. long-term effectiveness of 
digital health technologies, they emphasize the need for data from (long-term) 
naturalistic studies, which “will help demonstrate their usefulness and facilitate their 
adoption and integration into the mental health-care system” (Batra et al., 2017). In an 
ethical study, Lupton (2017) describes on peoples’ use of digital health tools, and “ways 
in which the concept of affective atmospheres can be applied to understand the 
sociocultural dimensions of digital health technologies”. He summarizes, that elements 
as “the acknowledgement of the role of the human senses in responding and contributing 
to affective atmospheres”, and as “the importance of using research methods which 
focus on embodied practice, feeling and action as well as on language and discourse” 
were the main focus areas in previous digital health related studies in the context of 
affective atmospheres (Lupton, 2017). Focusing on “data philanthropy”, “Quantified 
Self practices”, and the “concept of privacy”, Ajana (2017) examines biopolitical 
aspects of digital health self-tracking devices. By illuminating the use of digital health 
tracking devices from various perspectives, she concludes “issues of privacy, data 
ownership and security become all the more important, especially given the increasing 




2.4 Literature gap concerning appropriate concepts for clustering digital health 
business models 
In the literature review, no systematic overview or conceptualization pattern for 
clustering digital health business models was identified. Furthermore, existing research 
does not provide any comprehensive overview how venture capital resources are 
allocated in this sector yet. Referring to van Limburg et al. (2011), claiming digital 
health start-ups’ “inability to find funding”, this study seeks to fill the identified gap by 
focusing on the presented research questions - and thus, expand the portfolio of research 
questions in the digital health sector as claimed by Murray et al. (2016).  
3. Data and method 
3.1 Research Design 
Since digital health literature is rather nascent, a qualitative research approach, backed 
by several quantitative tests, was chosen for this study. Qualitative research approaches 
allow to discover and create theory in a situation when rather little is known about an 
underlying incident (Eisenhardt, 1989). Basing on firm specific situations as individual 
classifications and funding situations, a more generalized perspective on the digital 
health start-up industry was intended.  
3.2 Data Collection 
This study focuses on digital health start-ups from Europe and USA. In order to build-
up on an appropriate database, a systematic data collection based on clear defined 
criteria was performed initially. The data collection took place in the months of July to 
October 2018. The following criteria represent the pattern on which the systematic data 
collection was performed: 
(1) Business model needs to exhibit a clear link to the healthcare market 
(2) Business model needs to be supported by digital technologies  
(3) Foundation of company not more than six years ago 
(4) Foundation of company not less than six months ago (to avoid start-ups in the 
database with not finalized business models) 
For the US market, the start-up databank Crunchbase (Crunchbase Inc., 2018) was 




Crunchbase is repeatedly used by scholars from various fields and represents nowadays 
a trustful source of information in economic and managerial research. Dalle, J., M. den 
Besten and C. Menon (2017) suggest “that many more valuable avenues for economic 
and managerial research can be opened through the combination of Crunchbase with 
selected supplementary data sources”. Based on the fact that Crunchbase not only 
provides categorized company profiles, but information about funding and financing 
rounds of these companies as well, also these information were collected and 
implemented in the database underlying this study. For the European market, the various 
digital health start-ups information were mainly hand-collected through web analysis 
and by approaching various digital health institutions providing information about the 
local digital health start-up scene. In addition, also participant lists of business plan 
competitions as well as accelerator websites were screened systematically to build-up a 
comprehensive list of digital health start-ups based in Europe. Subsequently, 
information about funding and financing rounds of the listed European digital health 
start-ups were gathered by feeding search engines with search terms as “financing 
round” in combination with the individual company name. 
For the sake of clarity, all figures stated in the following are numbers in dollars. All 
European figures were calculated in dollars by adopting an currency exchange rate of 
0,88 (USD/EUR). In addition, each digital health IPO within the sample was interpreted 
as an exit transaction due to the fact shareholders often use the chance to sell their 
company shares after portfolio firms became listed. In this case, market capitalization at 
time of the IPO was used as exit transaction value. Exit transactions without public 
available data concerning the individual transaction value were not considered.  
3.3 Data Analysis 
After having listed all detectable digital health start-ups as well as their individual 
financing information for both regions, each individual company website was visited. 
Afterwards, based on the subsequently described categorization pattern, each company 







In the following, the results of this study are presented in sequential steps based on the 
chronological order of the underlying research questions. 
4.1 Research question 1: How look a conceptualization for the digital health 
sector like? Into which categories the current digital health start-up landscape 
could be separated? 
This study is based on a databank including 481 digital health start-ups located either in 
USA or Europe. In order to have an appropriate analysis basis for this digital health 
study, a clear classification approaches was needed. Accordingly, in slight adaption of 
the Silicon Valley bank classification approach (Silicon Valley Bank, 2018), a 
stakeholder-oriented approach was chosen for this study (Stroetmann et al., 2011). This 
self-developed pattern is described below. 
Table 1 reveals how the developed categorization pattern is organized: In the left 
column, the various main categories were listed. The right column represents the 
individual description for each main category. 
Table 1: Description of various digital health main categories. 
Main Category Description 
Professionals / Clinics 
(B2B) 
 
Digital health business models whose products/solutions exclusively 
addressing medical professionals (i.e. clinics/physicians, care 
facilities, doctor offices) as main users were assigned in this category. 
This category mainly includes B2B business models as in most cases 
the user of the product / solution is simultaneously the paying 
customer. In contrast to the “category patient-professional-
interaction”, products / solutions of digital health start-ups 
categorized in this area are used exclusively in a clinical environment 




This category gathers digital health start-ups whose products / 
solutions target the interaction between patients and their therapy-
guiding professional in an environment outside the actual therapy 
institution location. This category includes mainly B2B business 
models because the paying customer is in most cases rather the 
hospital / care facility or a health insurance. 
Patients / Consumers 
(B2C) 
Digital health start-ups focusing on the individual (i.e. healthy) 
consumer rather than on the (ill) patient are classified by this 
category. In other words, product / solutions of start-ups in this 




regulation requirements as they are primarily approaching well-being 
individuals as users / customers. Thus, in most of the cases, business 
models in this category exhibit a clear B2C character due to the fact 
that the consumer itself needs to pay the product / solution. 
Employers / Payers 
(B2B) 
This category lists digital health business models whose paying 
customers are not individual patients, professionals or consumers but 
institutions as employers or health insurances. In most cases, this 
category exhibits B2B business models. 
Life Science / Other 
(B2B) 
Digital health products / solutions targeting research institutions 
(mainly labs) are summarized in this category. Thus, this category 
has a clear B2B character. 
Afterwards, for each of these main categories, several sub categories were defined as 
Table 2 reveals. The left column shows the main categories. The centered column shows 
the connected sub categories, which are described in the right column. 
Table 2: Description of various digital health sub categories. 




Decision Support Digital health start-ups aiming to support physicians’ 
therapy decisions are categorized in this sub category. 
Mainly basing on artificial intelligence and big data 
these software algorithms are able to provide the 
physician additional data or direct therapy options / 
suggestions for the patient.  
Electronic Medical 
Records (EMR) 
Digital health start-ups striving for the digitalization of 
medical charts, papers and records are summarized in 
this sub category. By having the medical history of a 
patient electronically / digitally available, many 
advantages are accessible as i.e. a sharing process 
enhancement of medical information with other 
healthcare suppliers which treat the same patient. 
Patient Surveillance This sub category accumulates medical devices as 
sensors being directly linked to a software or other 
digital elements intended to measure and monitor the 





Software aiming to improve the practical workflow in 
clinics are gathered in this sub category. The goal of 
these business models is mainly to enhance the 
effectiveness and efficiency of hospitals in their daily 
operations. 
Digital Therapeutics Digital Therapeutics are digital and often online 




medical or psychological treatment of patients. Based 
on their non-invasive approach (in contrast to drugs) 
they are often based on digital impulses generated by a 
device (medtech device, smartphones, tablets, 
computers etc.) with the goal to lead to a change in 







This sub category includes technologies with the aim 
is to digitally monitor, guide and optimize medical 
medication (i.e. drug intake) of patients.  
(B2B) Remote Monitoring Remote monitoring are technologies (i.e. sensor-, 
smartphone- or cameras-based) for monitoring patients 
and their health condition outside the traditional 
clinical environment (clinic, care facility, nurse home 
etc.) inside their conventional environment (their 
homes).  
 Telemedicine Telemedicine describes medical diagnostics and 
therapy by bridging a spatial or temporal distance 
between doctor, therapist, pharmacist and the patient 
or between two consulting physicians by using 





Education Business models addressing the need for health 
information of consumers are assigned in this category. 
By providing such health information through apps, 
websites etc. they educate the consumer. 
 Enablement This sub category accumulates digital health start-ups 
developing medical devices enabling the consumer to 
act as physicians, i.e. in critical situations. By guiding 
the consumer on a very simplified way, the consumer 
is being enabled to help a patient. 
 Fitness / Wellness / 
Wearables / 
Tracking 
Business models based on mainly sensors intended to 
measure health conditions of consumers are 
summarized in this sub category. Ranging from very 
simple sensors only measuring the heart rate of 
consumers (fitness trackers) to complex sensors whose 
underlying software is able to generate medical 
instructions for patients, this category is rather 
comprehensive. In contrast to category “Electronic 
Medical Records” none of sensors in this category 
needs to be certified (medical regulatory). 
 Genetic Screening This sub category subsumes gene tests business models 
supported by digital algorithms, which are utilized in 
order to detect or rule out specific disorders of genes 




status quo, genetic tests are not reimbursed by health 
insurances yet, the payer of these tests are in most of 
the cases the private persons, which classify the 




In this sub category, business models are subsumed 
which aim to deliver information about different health 
service providers or insurances to patients searching 
for this information. These business models facilitate 
the information search for the patient and are 
furthermore offer an systematic comparison between 






Enterprise Health Management defines business 
models targeting the enhancement of employees’ 
health conditions. Thus, the customer in this sub 
category is not the employee, but the employer directly 
benefiting from the caused reduction of sick days of its 
employees. 
 Patient Engagement This sub category concludes digital health start-ups 
targeting on the approach to systematically educate and 
enhance the patient’s / insured person’s health 
competence and accountability with the primarily goal 
not only to help the patient but also to reduce 
insurance’s own expenses. 
 Value Based Care Digital health business models supporting the 
approach that healthcare suppliers are incentivized and 
paid by performance (rather than by a standard fee) are 
gathered in this sub category. The individual 
performance is measured by key performance 
indicators (KPIs) which are i.e. targeting on process 
quality within a hospital or to reduce blood pressure 
within a specific patient population. 
Life Science / 
Other 
(B2B) 
Operational All business models targeting (other) institutions in the 
broader healthcare sector helping the individual 
stakeholder to enhance the own operational workflows 
are concluded in this sub category. 
R&D  Software, apps or other solutions for research labs, life 
science enterprises or other research institutions are 
concluded in this sub category. 
For the sake of clarity, this categorization approach represents the basis for the 
subsequent digital health analysis. There are no other categories left besides the listed 
above. Thus, each company of the underlying databank needed to be allocable in one of 




Figure 1: Overview digital health business model categorization pattern. 
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4.2 Research question 2: How does the specific distribution of business models 
looks like in the defined digital health categories? What about the funding 
situation for digital health start-ups? Are there differences between the various 
categories? 
In a next step, based on the developed categorization pattern, all 481 digital health start-
ups were individually classified into the distinct main and sub categories. 
4.2.1 Distribution of business models 






Table 3: Descriptive statistics of funding volume of main categories (Note: All scores 
in $ million). 
 n (abs.) n (rel.) Min. Max. M SD 
Main categories       
Professional / Clinics 184 38,3% 0 548 33,1 75,1 
Patient-Professional-Interaction 91 18,9% 0 210 12,7 32,3 
Patients / Consumers 137 28,5% 0 486 22,0 60,2 
Employer / Payers 36 7,5% 0 252 44,9 58,7 
Life Science / Other 33 6,9% 0 210 21,5 43,4 
       
Sub categories       
Decision Support 38 7,9% 0 548 53,6 128,2 
Electronic Medical Records (EMR) 11 2,3% 0 40 13,1 12,4 
Patient Surveillance 41 8,5% 0 422 42,3 71,4 
Practice Management / Operational Workflows 94 19,5% 0 270 23,2 44,6 
       
Digital Therapeutics 41 8,5% 0 72 7,1 17,3 
Disease / Medication Management 11 2,3% 0 25 3,8 7,6 
Remote Monitoring 7 1,5% 0 31,6 4,9 11,8 
Telemedicine 32 6,7% 0 210 24,6 48,6 
       
Education 38 7,9% 0 223 19,2 45,3 
Enablement 14 2,9% 0 8,1 1,2 2,4 
Fitness / Wellness / Wearables / Tracking 60 12,5% 0 66 11,7 16,4 
Genetic Screening 9 1,9% 0 486 120,5 171,9 
Search (Professional, Insurance) 16 3,3% 0 246 30,1 65,0 
       
Enterprise Health Management 21 4,4% 0 252 55,9 68,6 
Patient Engagement / Benefits 8 1,7% 0 75 27,2 24,3 
Value Based Care 7 1,5% 0 148 32,0 51,9 
  0,0%     
Operational 10 2,1% 0 30 12,7 11,3 
R&D 23 4,8% 0 210 25,3 51,4 
       
Business model approach:       
B2B 305 63,4% 0 548 31,2 65,7 
B2C 176 36,6% 0 486 17,5 53,8 




As Table 3 reveals, the distribution is clearly diversified throughout the various main 
and sub categories. In the dataset of this study, more of a third (184 companies; 38,3%) 
of the digital health business models were assigned to the main category Professionals / 
Clinics. The second largest group (137 companies, 28,5%) is represented by the group 
of business models being linked to the group of Patients / Consumers. Nearly one fifth 
(91 companies, 18,9%) of digital health business models target the field of Patient-
Professional-Interaction. In contrast, digital health business models targeting Life 
Science companies (33 companies, 6,9%) and Employers / Payers (36 companies, 7,5%) 
were rather rare in the dataset. Considering the fact all categories but Patients / 
Consumers are categories exhibiting a clear B2B character, one of the main results of 
this first analysis step is B2C digital health business models are clearly exceeded by 
B2B business models in the sample (B2B: 305 companies, 63,4 % vs. B2C: 176 
companies, 36,6%).  
Focusing on sub categories, the most targeted sub category in the dataset is Practice 
Management / Operational Workflows (94 companies, 19,5%), followed by the B2C 
sub category Fitness / Wellness / Wearables / Tracking (60 companies, 12,5%). The 
former could be an indicator that digital health start-ups assume operational inefficiency 
in hospitals and doctor’s offices. The latter could be interpreted as the ongoing trend of 
“tracking” behavior of health-aware people being one of the key drivers for success 
stories as the company Runtastic being bought by adidas in 2015 for $ 240m (Adidas, 
2015). Further pronounced sub categories are Patient Surveillance (41 companies, 
8,5%), Digital Therapeutics (41 companies, 8,5%), Decision Support (38 companies, 
7,9%), as well as Education (38 companies, 7,9%). 
4.2.2 Funding volumes in various categories 
Focusing on the funding volumes, the sample reveals significant differences between 
the various categories. Business models positioned in main category “Professionals / 
Clinics” received the highest amount of venture capital funding (M=33,1, SD=75,1), 
followed by main categories “Employers / Payers” (M= 44,9, SD=58,7), and “Patients / 
Consumers” (M=22,0, SD=60,2). Lower amounts of venture capital funding flow into 
categories “Life Science / Other” (M=21,5, SD=43,4) and “Patient-Professional-




funding volume becomes clearly visible considering the difference of means between 
categories “Professionals / Clinics” and “Patient-Professional-Interaction”. Taking all 
main categories together, start-ups in the digital health sector received in average $ 26,2 
million venture capital funding (SD= 61,9). 
A one-way between subjects ANOVA F-test was conducted to compare the funding 
volume means of the distinct categories. Due to the low quantity of observations within 
sub categories, the analysis was focused only on main categories. Table 4 shows the 
results of this analysis: 
Table 4: One-Way Analysis of Variance of funding volume by main categories. 














Mean funding volume 33,3 12,7 22,0 44,9 21,5 2.72** 
N 184 91 137 36 33  
% of sample 38,3% 18,9% 28,5% 7,5% 6,9%  
 
Notes: Scores in $ million. (*p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01) 
Results suggest considerable heterogeneity between the various main categories in terms 
of funding volumes. There was a significant effect on the individual funding volume 
depending on the specific main category belonging at the p<.05 level [F (4,472) = 2.72, 
p = 0.027]. Specifically, business models acting in the category Patient-Professional-
Interaction received far less venture capital funding than business models targeting 
employers and payers. Considering the fact venture capital investors primarily strives 
for high returns on their investments (Macmillan, Siegel, and Narasimha, 1985), results 
suggest that venture capital investors do not evaluate the business models of the various 
digital health categories equally. Probably, they assume higher returns for their 
investments in categories stating a higher funding volume mean than in the other. 
Funding volumes also substantially differ between the two groups of  business model 
approaches (B2B vs. B2C) as Table 3 revealed. While the B2B group states a mean 




average only $ 17,5 million funding (SD= 53,8). An independent-samples t-test was 
conducted to test the equality of means. Table 4 shows the result. 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics of funding volume B2B vs. B2C approach. 
         




     
B2B 305 31,2 65,7  
B2C 176 17,5 53,8 2,470*** 
 
Notes: Scores in $ million, B2B includes categories: Professionals / Clinics, Patient-Professional-Interaction, Employers / 
Payers, Life Science / Others, B2C includes: "Patients / Consumers", t-test for equality of means (unequal variances); (*p<0.1, 
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01) 
 
There was a significant difference in the scores for B2B (M= 31,2, SD= 65,7) and B2C 
(M=17,5, SD= 53,8) conditions; t(305)=2,470, p = 0,007. These results could be an 
indicator that venture capital funds expect substantially higher chances for their invested 
capital in B2B business models rather than in B2B business models.  
4.2.3 Regional differences in terms of business model distribution and funding 
volumes 
In a next step, a comparison between the two regions Europe and USA was conducted 
in order to analyze whether business model distribution and funding volumes of digital 
health start-ups differ between these two regions. Table 6 lists and compares business 
model distribution and funding volumes of the various main categories in the two 
regions Europe and USA. An independent-samples t-test was simultaneously conducted 
to test the equality of means. Again, due to the low quantity of observations in the 





Table 6: Descriptive statistics and t-test comparison between funding volume of regions 
(Europe and USA). 
                          
Main category  Both regions  Europe  USA  t-test:  
  N Mean  N Mean  N Mean  Europe vs. USA  
             
Professionals / Clinics  184 33,3  61 4,8  123 47,2  -5,217***  
Patient-Professional-Interaction  91 12,7  71 2,5  20 48,7  -3,732***  
Patients / Consumers  137 22,0  77 6,1  60 42,4  -3,249***  
Employers / Payers  36 44,9  5 1,9  31 51,8  -4,568***  
Life Science / Other  33 21,5  13 3,5  20 33,2  -2,487**  
                          
In total  481 26,2  227 4,4  254 45,7  -8,157***  
 
Notes: Scores in $ million, t-test for equality of means 
(unequal variances); (*p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01),          
Table 6 suggests considerable heterogeneity between the two regions concerning 
funding volume in the individual main categories since every funding volume measured 
at the individual’s level significantly differs between the two regions. The results show 
that the European venture capital market is far less developed compared to the US 
market. The difference regarding the mean score for all categories in the two regions is 
particularly striking: There was a significant difference in the scores for mean funding 
volume in Europe (M=4.4, SD=11.7) and mean funding volume in USA (M=45.7, 
SD=79,7) conditions; t (265)=  -8,157, p = < 0.001. Considering the fact that sufficient 
capital in the starting phase of a business is one of the most important aspects for the 
success of a start-up, these results reveal a weak venture capital funding situation and 
thus, a quite challenging environment for digital health start-ups within Europe. 
In terms of business model distribution, it is obvious that the US market is clearly 
dominated by B2B digital health business models in the category of Professionals / 
Clinics. Nearly half of all US-located digital health business models (123 companies) 
were assigned to this category. In contrast, digital health business models exhibiting 




the fact that the category Patient-Professional-Interaction in Europe is clearly exceeding 
the US-based group (Europe: 70 companies, vs. USA: 20 companies). All the 
comparisons still hold validity adjusting the numbers between USA and Europe 
(normalization). 
4.3 Research question 3: Which categories are the most successful considering 
exit transaction values and investment multiples of venture capital investors? Are 
there differences between the various categories within the digital health sector? 
In a last step, analysis targeted on exit transactions within the digital health sector.  
4.3.1 Comparison of various categories 
Exit transactions represent the final payout for venture capital investors for their initial 
investments in a start-up. This is due to the fact that the majority of venture capital 
investors are closed investment funds (and thus, no evergreen funds) meaning they need 
to pay back the money they invested into start-ups to their various LPs (Limited 
Partners). Therefore, the liquidity event in scope of an exit transaction is an essential 
part of the venture capital cycle (Cumming, Fleming, and Schwienbacher, 2006). Table 





Table 7: Descriptive statistics of exit transaction volume of categories (Note: Scores in 
$ million). 
 n (abs.) n (rel.) Min. Max. M SD 
Main categories       
Professional / Clinics 38 48,7% 9,5 3443,0 515,6 752,9 
Patient-Professional-Interaction 7 9,0% 74,0 800,0 402,4 305,5 
Patients / Consumers 20 25,6% 6,0 4100,0 583,6 1065,5 
Employer / Payers 8 10,3% 60,0 3225,0 678,9 1044,7 
Life Science / Other 5 6,4% 150,0 1800,0 812,8 790,1 
       
Sub categories       
Decision Support 7 9,0% 93,0 2600,0 988,3 1046,2 
Electronic Medical Records (EMR) 2 2,6% 250,0 3443,0 1846,5 2257,8 
Patient Surveillance 5 6,4% 58,0 539,8 225,0 188,9 
Practice Management / Operational Workflows 24 30,8% 9,5 1100,0 327,4 348,2 
       
Digital Therapeutics 1 1,3% 74,0 74,0 74,0 0,0 
Disease / Medication Management 1 1,3% 800,0 800,0 800,0 0,0 
Remote Monitoring 1 1,3% 120,0 120,0 120,0 0,0 
Telemedicine 4 5,1% 125,0 758,0 455,8 260,1 
       
Education 6 7,7% 6,0 2800,0 654,5 1073,3 
Enablement 1 1,3% 20,0 20,0 20,0 0,0 
Fitness / Wellness / Wearables / Tracking 10 12,8% 18,0 4100,0 554,3 1252,4 
Genetic Screening 2 2,6% 550,0 1600,0 1075,0 742,5 
Search (Professional, Insurance) 1 1,3% 32,0 32,0 32,0 0,0 
       
Enterprise Health Management 3 3,8% 135,0 3225,0 1237,3 1724,8 
Patient Engagement / Benefits 4 5,1% 60,0 644,0 329,8 251,4 
Value Based Care 1 1,3% 400,0 400,0 400,0 0,0 
       
Operational 0 0,0% 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
R&D 5 6,4% 150,0 1800,0 812,8 790,1 





Table 7 depicts that (B2B) category “Professionals / Clinics” is the area exhibiting most 
of the 78 exit transactions in the digital health sector. Nearly half of all exit transactions 
took place in this category (n=38, 48,7%). With 20 exits (25,6%), the (B2C) category 
“Patients / Consumers” is the second strongest category considering exit transactions 
followed by category “Employers / Payers” (n=8, 10,3%).  With 7 (9,0%) and 5 (6,4%) 
exit transactions,  categories “Life Science / Other” as well as “Patient-Professional-
Interaction” were relatively rare in this context. In total, only 78 start-ups (16,2%) in the 
481 companies sample were exited, whether through M&A transactions or by an IPO. 
Considering the significant differences of funding volumes means between the various 
categories, the observations for exit transactions values are of high interest. As table 6 
reveals, category “Life Science / Other” exhibit the highest mean (M=812, SD= 790) in 
this context, followed by category “Employer / Payers” (M=678 SD=1044). Less 
attractive exit transaction values were achieved in the categories “Patients / Consumers” 
(M=583, SD= 1065) and “Professional / Clinics” (M=515, SD=752). Category “Patient-
Professional-Interaction” shows the lowest mean in this context, stating a score of 402 
(SD=305). No one-way ANOVA F-test was conducted to statistically verify differences 
between categories due to the small quantity of exit transaction value observations in 
the various categories. 
4.3.2 Comparison of regions 
Considering the significant differences in terms of funding volumes between the two 
regions Europe and USA, regional exit transaction observations were compared to each 





Table 8: Descriptive statistics of exit transaction volume of main categories in different 
regions. 
Main  category n (abs.) n (rel.) Min. Max. M SD 
Europe:       
Professional / Clinics 1 1,3% 200,0 200,0 200,0 0,0 
Patient-Professional-Interaction 2 2,6% 74,0 120,0 97,0 32,5 
Patients/ Consumers 3 3,8% 67,0 1.600,0 612,3 856,9 
Employer / Payers 0 0,0% n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Life Science / Other 1 1,3% 150,0 150,0 150,0 0,0 
All categories (Europe) 7 9,0% 0,0 1.600,0 340,1 557,7 
       
USA:       
Professional / Clinics 37 47,4% 9,5 3.443,0 524,1 761,4 
Patient-Professional-Interaction 5 6,4% 125,0 800,0 524,6 272,8 
Patients/ Consumers 17 21,8% 6,0 4.100,0 578,5 1.120,8 
Employer / Payers 8 10,3% 60,0 3.225,0 678,9 1.044,7 
Life Science / Other 4 5,1% 261,0 1.800,0 978,5 805,8 
All categories (USA) 71 91,0% 6,0 4.100,0 580,2 859,4 
              
All categories (Both regions) 78 100,0% 0,0 4.100,0 558,7 836,9 
 
Notes: Scores in $ million 
As table 8 reveals, it is obvious that the American exit market seems to be much more 
potent compared to the European. In total, from 78 exit transactions, 71 (=78%) were 
US-based transactions whereby only 7 (=9,0%) exit transactions happened in Europe. 
In line with other venture capital studies comparing global exit markets as Nahata, 
Sonali, and Tandon (2014) or Cumming and Walz (2010), results suggest that European 
digital health founders should possibly wonder whether founding their company 
overseas could be a better option. Due to the low quantity of observations within Europe, 





4.3.3 Comparison of investment multiples 
In a final step, exit transaction values were considered and being utilized for a multiple 
analysis. Multiples indicate venture capital funds how attractive investments of other 
investors were in the past. Based on the simple calculation of building a ratio between 
the transaction value achieved and the total funding volume a company received 
(before), multiple were calculated for each start-up, where both observations (funding 
volume and exit transaction value) were available.  By doing so, it is possible to verify 
both, on one hand, to evaluate if the digital health sector worth to being covered by 
investments of venture capital funds and, on the other hand, to compare, which of the 
specific (main) categories are the most attractive for venture capital investors. Table 9 
shows the scores for the various (main) categories. 
Table 9: Descriptive statistics of achieved multiples in various categories. 
  N M SD 
Main categories:    
Professionals / Clinics 38 23,96 43,60 
Patient-Professional-Interaction 7 30,03 48,63 
Patients / Consumers 20 20,09 37,09 
Employers / Payers 8 26,97 45,84 
Life Science / Other 5 40,81 55,12 
All categories 78 24,90 42,56 
    
Notes: Scores in $ million, calculation of Multiple: 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑒 = Exit transaction value
Funding volume
, i.e. Investment Multiple of 
3x = Exit transaction volume of $ 180 million divided by funding volume of $ 60 million. 
As table 9 depicts, category “Life Science / Other” was the most attractive category for 
venture capital investors in the past. By placing investments in this area, the average 
realized multiple was 40,8x. Also investments in the categories “Patient-Professional-
Interaction” (30,0x) and “Employers / Payers” (26,9x) were valuable for venture capital 
investors. In contrast, investments in start-ups acting in the field of “Professional / 
Clinics” (23,9x) and “Patients / Consumers” (20,0x) were relatively unattractive 
considering the significant risk in these venture capital transactions. Across all 




interpreted as attractive taking into account the average multiple in this sector of 24,9x.  
Due to their small quantity, multiple observations were not sufficient to conduct a one-
way ANOVA F-test to statistically compare categories. As an alternative, by merging 
categories into the groups B2B and B2C, an unpaired-samples t-test was conducted to 
compare multiple scores in B2B and B2C conditions. Table 10 shows the results: 
Table 10: t-test comparison between B2B vs. B2C multiples. 
  N M SD t-test: 
B2B vs. B2C 
Business model approach:     
B2B 58 54,87 245,08  
B2C 20 20,09 37,09 1,05 
     
Notes: Scores in $ million, B2B includes categories: Professionals / Clinics, Patient-Professional-
Interaction, Employers / Payers, Life Science / Others, B2C includes: "Patients / Consumers", t-test 
for equality of means (unequal variances); (*p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01) 
There was no significant difference in the scores for B2B (M= 54,87, SD= 245,08) and 
B2C (M=20,09, SD= 37,09) conditions; t(64)=1,05, p = 0,15. These results suggest that 
chances for venture capital funds are not significant higher when investing capital in 
B2B rather than in B2C business models. Considering previous results of this study 
shown in table 5, higher expectations of venture capital investors for B2B business 
models (= higher funding volume in this group compared to B2C group) are not 
statistically backed by investment multiple data in this sample.  
 
5. Discussion and Implications 
This study enhances the debate of digital health with various insights. Based on the 
presented five-fold categorization pattern, the results of this analysis show that the 
current landscape within the digital health sector exhibits a clear B2B focus. In fact, both 
regions (Europe and USA) show data proving this B2B emphasis. It indicates that past 
founders are assuming more potential in business models addressing professional 




reimbursement issues by health insurances (Stroetmann et al., 2011) or the assumption 
that many people are showing absent willingness to pay privately for health services. As 
to ascertain this is not the aim of this study, future researchers are invited to investigate 
this further. 
With regard to the regional data presented in this study, the results are in line with other 
studies as Schwienbacher (2002) or Nahata, Sonali, and Tandon (2014) stating a 
significant contrast between the two regions with regards to the venture capital 
environment as well. The European venture capital market still lacks to reduce the 
significant venture capital gap (Bottazzi and Da rin, 2002). This is not only a 
phenomenon in the digital health sector, but in the whole venture capital scene, as shown 
by the figures of PitchBook and Invest Europe: They report venture capital fundings 
within 2017 in the amount of $ 131 billion (PitchBook Data Inc., 2017) and only $ 73 
billion (Invest Europe, 2017). Since funding is only one side of the coin, also exit 
transactions need to be taken into account when evaluating venture capital markets. With 
the clear contrast of 7 (Europe) vs. 71 (USA) exit transactions, the impression of a 
clearly outperformed European venture capital market holds true. In addition, this 
picture is also triangulated by the fact that not only the total amount of venture capital 
financings is higher in the USA than in Europe, but also the total average money flowing 
into a start-up when a financing round is taking place.  Summarized, past literature’s 
calling for an acceleration of the European venture capital market (i.e. Schwienbacher, 
2002) should be supported by this article. 
However, this study also indicates that the digital health space in general is an attractive 
field for venture capital investors (in both regions) considering the achieved multiples 
on investment in the past. By searching the rationale behind it, assumptions could be 
made that the healthcare market still exhibit many inefficiencies in daily operations (i.e. 
in hospitals)  where digitalization could be an appropriate and efficiency-enhancing 
response (Murray et al., 2016; Schweitzer and Synowiec, 2012) - leading to a high 
demand of these users for such solutions. Venture capital investors counting on this 





This study provides an overview about the status quo in the digital health sector within 
Europe and USA. The findings could be fruitful for several stakeholders. First, start-up 
founders or persons planning to found a digital health business could use the data to get 
insights into financial data in the digital health sector. Based on the conceptualization 
provided in this study, the own business idea or model could be assigned to one of the 
(sub) categories to receive specific information about the various financial figures 
examined in this study. In addition, founders should take into account that the current 
digital health landscape is clearly B2B oriented yet. Perhaps, it could be a smart idea to 
position the own business rather in the B2C than in the B2B sector due to the recent 
B2C vacuum within the digital health sector. However, there will be also reasons for 
this clear B2B focus based on specific conditions, founders should consider that. 
Another aspect of importance for founders could be the apparent affinity of venture 
capital investors to specific (sub) categories or topics within the digital health sector. 
Based on the fact that funding situations differ significantly in some parts, founders 
should at least be aware of these circumstances. Second, also venture capital investors 
should be aware of the results of this article. Building upon the results presented, they 
could reevaluate their own digital health investment strategy and verify if and how own 
investment activities are covered in the provided figures. In addition and most 
interesting for investors, also their own digital health investment results could be 
compared to the market by confronting them with categories’ average multiples being 
achieved. Third, the regional data provided in this study could be a foundation for 
European policymakers to try to find new solutions or triggers to fight the current 
bottleneck (Maas et al., 2018) within the European venture capital market in order to 
strive for an alignment of the local venture capital market more towards the US status 
quo. 
 
6. Limitations and suggestions for research 
Clearly, this study has limitations and is only a first step in understanding the dynamics 
in the digital health sector. Due to its rather small sample size, the underlying database 
used in this study cannot provide holistic conclusions about the digital health 




that the analysis can explain the dramatic differences between the European and US 
regions in terms of financing situations and exit transactions. However, this study is well 
suited to spark the discussion on these differences and on the digital health sector in 
general for further research. 
More empirical work needs to be conducted to systematically monitor the evolution in 
this innovative sector. This study relied on partly hand-collected key informants 
gathered in a systematic landscape analysis. Data have been triangulated with additional 
data sources as press releases, corporate websites and media. To extend the scope of this 
study, further research in this field should also include interviews with founders as well 
as venture capital investors to cover also a qualitative perspective on this topic. 
Nonetheless, the data and results of this study provide first insights into the current status 
quo in the venture capital environment of the digital health space. Besides examining 
the findings with larger samples (especially due to European digital health exit 
transactions), researchers are invited to dig deeper into insights and results of this study 
and further analyse key outcomes like the significant multiple differences for venture 
capital investors between the various categories within the digital health sector. Future 
research may find it valuable to pay further attention to the distribution of business 
models within the digital health sector. Will the clear B2B character of business models 
continue or shift more towards a rather mixed picture between B2B and B2C start-ups? 
Moreover, the findings should also serve as an impetus for investigating the further 
development of the contrasts between the regions of Europe and USA with regards to 
their individual venture capital environment. Will the significant differences in terms of 
venture capital funding as well as exit transactions persist on this level or will the 





By categorizing, analyzing and comparing the current digital health start-up landscape 
in the regions of Europe and USA, this study sheds new light on the status quo within 
the digital health industry. Based on a five-fold categorization pattern, the findings 
indicate that the sector exhibits a clear B2B focus, whereby most of business models 
focus on solutions for professional players as hospitals or other health provider 
institutions. By gathering funding information about the individual companies within 
the sample of 481 start-ups, the analysis shows that the funding situations differ 
significantly between the two regions of Europe and USA, whereby US-based start-ups 
receive much more growth capital from venture capital investors than their European 
competitors. Due to the insights presented in this study, future researches are encouraged 
to build-up on and continue the monitoring and examination of the highly innovative 
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7 Third article: Start-ups in a Corporate Accelerator: What is 
Satisfying, What is Relevant and What can Corporates Improve? 
Abstract: Corporate accelerators have emerged rapidly over the last few 
years and have become a cross-industrial global phenomenon. Established 
companies interact with start-ups through these programmes in a structured 
approach. Recent academic research shows that programmes exist with 
diverse characteristics, providing various resources and services such as 
investment capital, office space, mentoring or training to the start-ups. 
Currently, the corporate accelerator landscape is undergoing change, with 
companies adjusting their programme characteristics. One reason for this 
development seems to be that companies struggle to provide the right 
resources to start-ups. The extant corporate accelerator literature, however, 
does not provide any insights into the value of the different resources 
provided to start-ups in such programmes. Thus we analyse, empirically 
and in-depth, one of the longest active corporate accelerator programmes, 
taking the start-ups’ perspective. Investigating Wayra, the corporate 
accelerator of Telefónica in Germany, we shed light on what is satisfying, 
what is relevant and what corporates can improve on. 
Keywords: Corporate Accelerators, Corporate Venturing, Participants, 






Established companies struggle to create, capture and deliver innovation because they 
inadvertently but inevitably suffer from organizational inertia (Hannan and Freeman, 
1977; Hill and Rothaermel, 2003). The knowledge and skills necessary to generate 
innovations often reside outside the corporate boundaries (Chesbrough, 2003; von 
Hippel, 2005) and entrepreneurial start-ups are frequently considered valuable sources 
for corporations to mitigate this dilemma (Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005). Under growing 
pressure to come up with innovative products, services and business models, established 
companies increasingly initiate collaborations with young, entrepreneurial ventures 
(Weiblen and Chesbrough, 2015; Spender et al., 2017; Viardot, 2017). In order to do so, 
launching a corporate accelerator programme has become a widespread activity which 
has seen a significant surge since the early 2010s (Kohler 2016).  
Corporate accelerators are typically programmes that support selected start-ups for a 
specific time to accelerate their development, sponsored by and in close collaboration 
with established companies (Miller and Bound, 2011; Cohen and Hochberg, 2014). The 
increasing number of such programmes is observable across international companies 
from diverse industries: examples include Volkswagen and Daimler from automotive, 
Merck and Bayer from pharmaceuticals or MasterCard, and ING Group from the 
financial services. Overall, the corporate accelerator database lists more than 70 active 
programmes for the end of 2016 (Corporate Accelerator Database, 2016). However, 
estimates give an even higher number, with more than 120 active programmes currently 
worldwide (Desai, 2016). 
Research has also explored this phenomenon and the number of academic articles 
focusing on corporate accelerators has increased over the last years. Recent publications 
provide a general understanding of corporate accelerators, their characteristics and 
components (e.g. Kanbach and Stubner 2016; Kohler, 2016; Pauwels et al., 2016). 
Programme characteristics include the provision of different resources and services from 
the programmes to the start-ups including, for example, capital, internal and external 
contacts, mentoring, coaching and office space (Kanbach and Stubner 2016; Kohler, 
2016). Besides the identification and description of these provided resources and 




are not. This understanding, however, is of high relevance as the corporate accelerator 
landscape is changing.   
The number of programmes appears to have peaked. However, it is not the high number 
of new programme launches that seems to make the news, but instead their relaunch. 
Several companies are changing their programme structures and approaches 
significantly. For example, the German media house Axel Springer stopped its 2013 
launched programme in 2017 to partner with the automotive company Porsche and the 
accelerator expert Plug & Play to relaunch the accelerator with a new focus in 2018. 
Meanwhile, the global insurance company Allianz changed its approach to become a 
corporate venture capitalist investing in digital growth companies in the insurance 
ecosystem. 
Reasons for this change might be the lack of achievement in the different objectives that 
companies set for the corporate accelerator programmes. The objectives include getting 
a glimpse of current market developments, insourcing external innovation, providing a 
protected environment to work on new products or gaining a financial benefit from 
investing in promising start-ups (Kanbach and Stubner, 2016). Independently of the 
specific objective for the corporate accelerator, one of the most important success factors 
is the attraction of the most promising start-ups. Therefore, one reason for the recent 
change in the corporate accelerator landscape might be rooted in the inadequate 
provision of resources and services to these start-ups. 
Existing research, however, does not provide any insights into the start-ups’ perspective; 
there is a lack of observation of their evaluations of the different resources or services 
that are provided, and little recognition of the recent change in the corporate accelerator 
landscape. An insight into the start-ups’ perspective can contribute to understanding 
these recent changes and extending the corporate entrepreneurship literature on how 
start-ups can benefit from established companies in the context of corporate accelerator 
programmes. Therefore, this empirical study aims to shed light on the start-up 





1) With which programme characteristics (provided resources and services) are 
start-ups satisfied in a corporate accelerator programme? 
2) Which programme characteristics are relevant for start-ups in a corporate 
accelerator programme? 
3) What are the shortcomings in terms of programme characteristics in a corporate 
accelerator programme?  
Thus, we proceed as follows. First, we provide insights into literature related to 
corporate accelerators in order to understand the background of such programmes. We 
then illuminate the in-depth case study based research approach and describe the 
approach of the analysed corporate accelerator Wayra from Telefónica. Based on the 
sample of 20 start-ups which participated in this corporate accelerator and the analysis 
of additional qualitative data sources, we derive the satisfying and relevant programme 
characteristics and analyse its shortcomings in-depth. We conclude with a discussion of 
future research areas as well as implications for practitioners in the field of corporate 
entrepreneurship. 
 
2 Corporate Accelerator Literature 
As this study is of an explorative character, we provide a short overview of corporate 
accelerator research for a general understanding of the phenomenon. As this field of 
research is still very nascent, no general concepts are available to inform the direction 
of our interview approach. 
Academic studies, as well as statistics, show that corporate accelerators have become a 
frequent phenomenon in the corporate world across all industries and on a global level. 
Corporate accelerators are special organizational forms representing the opportunity for 
incumbent companies to create an outside-in open innovation process (Weiblen and 
Chesbrough, 2015), nurture innovations from entrepreneurial ventures and transfer these 
innovations to the incumbent company (Kohler, 2016). Research in the field of corporate 
accelerators is proliferating, as the number of existing publications in this field has 
increased over the last years. These studies mainly focus on providing an understanding 
of the phenomenon of corporate accelerators, including definitions, programme features 




The existing literature examines the accelerator phenomenon and describes accelerators 
as "a fixed-term, cohort-based programme, including mentorship and educational 
components that culminates in a public pitch event or demo-day" (Cohen, 2013, p.4). 
Hence, accelerators aim to accelerate successful venture creation by providing specific 
incubation services during an intensive programme of limited duration (Miller and 
Bound, 2011; Cohen and Hochberg, 2014).    
 
Furthermore, heterogeneity in the corporate accelerator approaches is recognized. 
Kohler (2016) highlights different organizational choices to set up an accelerator 
programme in addition to its proposition, process and people: Inside the corporation, 
outside the corporation, independently with an external partner or as a virtual 
accelerator. Each of these choices brings specific advantages and disadvantages 
regarding flexibility, cost, and control. In addition to these organizational differences in 
the programme configurations, Kanbach and Stubner (2016) identify different 
objectives and programme foci such as the inclusion of equity involvement, venture 
stages or industry focus as dimensions by which corporate accelerator programmes are 
different from each other. Similarly, Pauwels et al. (2016) describe the design elements 
of accelerators, including programme package, strategic focus, selection process, 
funding structure, and alumni relations, and derive three different models of accelerator 
programmes. In line with this heterogeneity in programme configurations, Richter et al. 
(2018) argue that the common attribute of accelerators is focused on process rather than 
structure, as accelerators seek to speed up the early stages of the start-up process to 
identify whether they could speed or scale up.  
The authors of these studies all highlight that the different configurations of programme 
characteristics accelerator programmes may influence the programme’s success. This, 
however, remains completely unexplored in the existing literature, which does not assess 
which programme characteristics are potentially relevant from a start-up perspective. 
Due to the fact that the corporate accelerator landscape is currently changing, with 
companies re-configuring their approaches, there is reason to believe that existing 





3 Research Design, Methodology and Data 
3.1 Research Design 
Since little is known about the value of different programme characteristics and the 
shortcomings of corporate accelerator programmes from a start-up perspective, we 
chose an explorative qualitative research approach. Qualitative data can yield deep 
insights into the phenomenon under review by considering causal relationships, 
complex patterns and context-specific factors. We chose qualitative research because it 
is also sensitive to organizational context and a valid method of investigating dynamic 
processes in organisations (Pettigrew, 1992), such as the acceleration of external start-
ups. Moreover, it enables theory to be discovered and generated in a context in which 
relatively little is known about the underlying phenomenon (Eisenhardt 1989). This 
single-site case study employs an exploratory (Strauss and Corbin, 2008) and inductive 
research design providing an in-depth, longitudinal analysis of a revelatory case (Yin, 
1994). It represents an inductive inquiry (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) moving from 
specific observations of start-ups to a more generalized view in order to better identify 
what is satisfying for start-ups, what is relevant for them and what corporates can 
improve in regards to corporate accelerator programmes. 
3.2 Case Selection 
In order to retrieve comparable results from the start-ups, we selected one corporate 
accelerator programme for in-depth analysis, in which all sample start-ups have 
participated. We selected the accelerator programme Wayra of the global 
telecommunications company Telefónica. In line with Yin (1994), this case combines 
several reasons for being a well-suited research object to understand the start-up 
perspective within a corporate accelerator programme: First, Wayra was initially 
launched in 2011, making it one of the longest-running corporate accelerator 
programmes worldwide with one of the largest numbers of participated start-ups. 
Second, the former Wayra approach consisted of the typical corporate accelerator 
characteristics, such as the time-limited programme, equity investments and structured 
start-up support, making it an ideal programme for the identification of potential 




granted us in-depth insights and unique access to corporate documents, which highly 
supports the in-depth analysis of this case. 
3.3 Case Description 
Wayra is the corporate start-up accelerator programme of Telefónica - the Spanish 
multinational telecommunications and broadband provider which also trades the brands 
O2, Vivo and Movistar. Over the last few years, Telefónica has launched several 
initiatives to promote entrepreneurship and investments in technological projects within 
its global open innovation and corporate entrepreneurship network called Open Future. 
Wayra was initiated in order to accelerate newly created start-ups, launching first in 
Latin America and Spain in 2011. Today, Wayra is a network of accelerators with a 
presence in eleven hubs located in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Germany, 
Mexico, Peru, Spain, the UK and Venezuela. Within this case study, we focus only on 
Wayra Germany, based in Munich. Since its launch in November 2012, the corporate 
acceleration programme under review has accelerated 39 start-ups in eight batches. The 
success rates of these companies has fluctuated: 24 are still active, 4 have been 
successfully acquired and 11 have failed; internal challenges, questionable performance 
and the insignificant impact for Telefónica generated by start-ups in comparison to other 
Wayra accelerators forced Telefónica to make organizational changes. Thus, new 
management was hired and, together with a new team of experienced corporate-start-up 
professionals, Christian Lindener – the CEO of Wayra Germany – rethought Wayra’s 
strategy. 
In November 2017, Wayra1 announced a relaunch and a new direction: “It’s time to 
transform. Wayra is going to change. A long, intensive journey lies behind us. We are 
thirsty. We are hungry. But the bells are ringing for the final spurt before we explode” 
(Munich Start-up, 2017).  
A core change in Wayra´s programme structure was its shift towards the so-called 
venture client model (see Table 1). Wayra specifically narrowed down its start-up focus 
to innovative digital technologies such as data analytics, cybersecurity, artificial 
intelligence and the Internet of Things. Furthermore, start-ups now must be in a later 
                                               
1 From here on, whenever we use the Word 'Wayra' we refer to 'Wayra Deutschland GmbH' - the 




stage phase, with market-ready products or well-working prototypes. Instead of 
receiving direct funding, start-ups now begin with a pre-acceleration phase and then 
work on concrete paid pilot projects which are clearly linked to the Telefónica 
organisation.  
Table 1   Comparison of Wayra’s corporate accelerator approaches 
 
  Former approach New approach (Venture Client) 
Start-up Focus 
Consumer IoT, Big Data, Financial 
& Banking, Video Technology, 
Entertainment & Apps, 
Cybersecurity, Digital Shopping 
Solutions 
IoT, Data Analytics, Cybersecurity, 
Artificial Intelligence 
Access to 
Telefónica Potential pilot project 
Direct access to Telefónica with a paid 
pilot and Telefónica as a customer  
Start-up Stage Early stage Later Stage 
Financing Up to 40,000 € equity 
First Phase: Zero Equity including 
paid pilot (25,000 €) 
Afterwards: option to follow-on 
investment (up to 350,000 €) 
Duration 6 months; Culminating in a demo day 
First Phase: Pre-Acceleration 
Second Phase: 3 month project 
Third Phase: Potential long-term 
engagement with Wayra/Telefónica; 
No demo day 
Education Coaching Welcome day; Intensive and tailor-made coaching  
Infrastructure Co-working space and IT infrastructure 
Co-working space and IT 
infrastructure 
Mentoring Not part of the programme 
Mentoring network with direct 
mentors from within Telefónica's 
Business Units (industry experts) and 
other founders 
 
3.4 Data Collection 
In the beginning, we undertook discussions with the management team of Wayra, a 
review of corporate documents and site visits to understand the selected accelerator 
programme in-depth. This even included a two-week visit to the Wayra co-working 
space attending social events, participating in meetings and impromptu and informal 
conversations with the staff and portfolio start-ups. Subsequently, we conducted 21 
formal, semi-structured interviews with the CEOs and/or start-up founders who have 
completed or were about to complete the corporate accelerator programme (see Table 2 




expression of the experiences and views of the interviewees. We added new questions 
during the interview process to cover important topics that surfaced in earlier interviews 
(Gioia et al., 2013). All interviews were conducted via telephone between January and 
March 2018. The average interview length was 38 minutes; 13 interviews were 
conducted in German and 8 interviews in English. We later translated the statements of 
the respondents from German into English. The series of interviews was terminated 
when the feeling of theoretical saturation (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) was given. 
Table 2    Sample details 









Start-up 1 Sports 1 < 1 year Exit (Failed) 40:53 
Start-up 2 Education 1 < 1 year Exit (Failed) 36:19 
Start-up 3 Crowdsharing 2 < 1 year Active (Alumni) 47:42 
Start-up 4 Education 2 < 1 year Exit (Failed) 36:30 
Start-up 5 Navigation 2 1 - 2 years Exit (Failed) 55:02 
Start-up 6 Online Shipping 3 < 1 year Exit (Failed) 34:01 
Start-up 7 Education 3 1 - 2 years Active (Alumni) 50:12 
Start-up 8 Parking 3 < 1 year Exit (Acquired) 20:10 
Start-up 9 Mobile Advertising 4 2 - 3 years Exit (Acquired) 38:00 
Start-up 10 Mobile Network Services 4 < 1 year Active (Alumni) 28:39 
Start-up 11 Mobile Payment 5 < 1 year Active (Alumni) 28:22 
Start-up 12 Telco 5 1 - 2 years Active (Alumni) 56:51 
Start-up 13 Data Security 5 > 10 years Active (Alumni) 35:28 
Start-up 14 IoT / Smart Home 6 < 1 year Active (In-academy) 30:55 
Start-up 15 Customer Service (Chatbot) 6 < 1 year Active (In-academy) 33:34 
Start-up 16 Business Analytics 6 < 1 year Active (In-academy) 31:49 
Start-up 17 Mobile Network Services 6 1 - 2 years Active (In-academy) 40:16 
Start-up 18 Data Security 6 < 1 year Active (In-academy) 39:10 
Start-up 19 IoT / Smart Home 8 2 - 3 years Active (In-academy) 49:54 
Start-up 20 Customer Service 8 5 - 10 years Active (In-academy) 22:03 
We gathered information about each start-up to reflect and support the results (see Table 
2). In addition to primary data, we analysed Wayra-internal archival data and corporate 
publications, as well as newspaper and magazine articles (see Table 3). This allowed us 
to generate an understanding from empirical data and helped verify and clarify 
statements made by the informants. We used these sources to (1) build an understanding 




corporate accelerator; (2) capture how start-ups enrolled in the corporate accelerator 
programme perceive its shortcomings and benefits; (3) trace the strategies that the 
corporate accelerator engaged in to address these; and, more generally, (4) triangulate 
our interpretations and observations with other sources of data.  
Table 3   Data collection details 
Description of Data Type of Data Source of Data 
Interview with Wayra 
Management 
In-depth interview Authors 
Interviews with start-ups Semi-structured interviews Authors 
Wayra-internal archival data 
PowerPoint presentations, Excel 
spreadsheets 
Wayra management 
Corporate publications of Wayra 
Newsletter, press release, website 
announcements 
Wayra's website and 
social media channels 
Public press articles about Wayra 
Newsfeeds, Blog articles, 
interviews, press articles, 
magazine articles, newspaper 
articles 
Wayra management 
and Google search 
 
3.5 Data Analysis 
Our analysis consisted of a series of steps following the procedures and techniques for 
grounded-theory building and naturalistic inquiry (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Locke, 
2001). We employed MaxQDA, a qualitative research software supporting transcription 
and coding of our qualitative data. Overall, we followed an ongoing, iterative and 
inductive process to develop the final coding system in line with our research questions. 
Performing the final coding, the interviews yielded a database of 930 codable 
statements. Following Corley & Gioia (2004) each statement consisted of a sentence or 
paragraph conveying a coherent point (Weber, 1990) about the relevant aspects of our 
research questions.  
For the sake of clarity, we present our analysis in three sequential steps following our 
research questions: First, we analyse the satisfaction level of the participants in the 
programme characteristics of the corporate accelerator. Second, we clarify which 




based on the first two steps, we identify shortcoming areas of the corporate accelerator 
and conduct an in-depth analysis within these defined shortcoming areas. We do so by 
applying the Gioia procedure for concept development (Goia et al., 2013). 
 
4 Results 
4.1 Identification of satisfaction level of participants for the different resources 
and services provided 
In our interviews, we aimed to receive comprehensive feedback not only on the most 
obvious but on all resources and services provided by the corporate accelerator 
programme. We clustered the various aspects of the programme in eight distinct areas 
and covered them accordingly in our semi-structured interview guide as well as in our 
coding scheme. By doing so, we received an appropriate and comprehensive analysis 
pattern in order to evaluate the performance of the corporate accelerator in a well-





Table 4   Details on data collection 






This area covers the transaction-specific aspects that come with participation 
in the corporate accelerator programme. It includes not only the number of 
capital participants received but also its contractual base, as well as its 
equity character. 
Location / Office 
space 
This area addresses the infrastructure offering of the corporate accelerator to 
its participants. Besides the actual location of the offices, the equipment (IT 
etc.) and working atmosphere component is also included. 
Demo Day 
In addition to the general organizational set-up of this event, also other key 
aspects of this programme-processual endpoint are included (e.g. invited 
audience) 
Collaboration with 
other participants  
(current / alumni) 
In this area, we asked for the collaboration between the participants and if 
the individual had received a benefit from it. In addition, we included 
alumni activities of the corporate accelerator as well. 
Collaboration with  
corporate accelerator 
This area addresses the collaboration between participants and the corporate 
accelerator itself. It primarily focuses on communication, the duration of the 
programme and the general collaboration mode. 
Coaching / 
Mentoring 
As two of the key characteristics of a corporate accelerator, this area covers 
both the various coaching lessons (quality & quantity of units and lessons 
learned) within the programme, but also the mentoring aspects as the in-
depth challenge of the individual business models. 
External network of  
corporate accelerator  
(e.g. to investors) 
This aspect is targeting the network of the corporate accelerator beyond the 
own parent company. It mainly addresses the contacts to external investors 
being potential financing parties in the future for the participants or the 
contact with other corporates. 
Collaboration with 
parent company 
This area covers all aspects of the collaboration between the participants and 
the different project teams inside the parent company. Among others, it 
includes the aspect of getting in-touch with persons in the parent company 
as well as their commitment and working speed once joint projects were 
launched. 
 
In each of these areas, we first asked our interview partners for a statement regarding a 
general assessment of whether the corporate accelerator fulfilled their expectations in 
this area. Based on this superordinate evaluation, we asked detailed questions about 
which specific aspects led to the statement.  
 
In our analysis, we clustered each collected, theme-specific coding of our interviews in 
subgroups of positive, rather mixed and negative feedback. This categorization allowed 
us to draw conclusions regarding participants’ general mood with respect to the 
individual area. Thus, we were able to identify if, in the individual area, the general 




Unlike that which was anticipated, the results in most of the areas were clear. Table 5 
depicts the results. 
Table 5   Details on data collection 








Equity deal (money/capital) x     
Location / Office space x     
Demo Day     x 
Collaboration with other participants 
(current/alumni)*   x   
Collaboration with corporate 
accelerator x     
Coaching / Mentoring     x 
External network of corporate 
accelerator (e.g. to investors)     x 
Collaboration with parent company     x 
* Mixed results in this area with rather negative than positive assessment 
 
Finding 1: The corporate accelerator showed the poorest performance in the areas of 
“Collaboration with parent company”, “Coaching / Mentoring” and 
“Network of accelerator (e.g. investors)” and respectively in “Demo day”. 
4.2 Clarification of significance level of the various provided resources and services 
In the semi-structured interview guide, we also covered the question of which specific 
aspects of the corporate accelerator were elementary for the interview partner - and 
which were not. In order to understand this in detail, we also asked for the potential 
benefits each informant hoped to receive by participating in the corporate accelerator 
programme and why the interview partners decided to join the corporate accelerator. 
The most relevant area for the participants was the corporate accelerator’s money/capital 
offer. We received many answers in the similar vein of “we basically considered the 
accelerator as the first option how to get some funds for the company”. In addition, 
participants awarded high relevance to the aspect of getting in touch with the corporate 
accelerator’s parent company to do joint business. One participant stated: “First of all, 
we aim to get (...) a contract or a deal with Telefónica”. Furthermore, the expectation of 
gaining valuable contacts to investors through the corporate accelerator’s external 
network was another frequently stated reason when asking for relevance: “Getting 




implied benefits, other explicit offers of the corporate accelerator mattered for the 
interview partners: The opportunity to receive coaching and mentoring (“all of us were 
very young and inexperienced, so we hoped to receive good mentoring”) as well as the 
office infrastructure offered for the own project were frequently stated reasons. In 
contrast, our results demonstrate that the aspects of “Collaboration with the corporate 
accelerator”, “Collaboration participants” and “Demo Day” were the areas that exhibited 
the lowest significance for participants.  
 
Finding 2:  The corporate accelerator participants awarded the areas of “Equity deal 
(money/capital) and “Collaboration with parent company” with the highest relevance. 
Furthermore, the aspects of “Coaching / Mentoring” and “Network of accelerator (e.g. 
investors)” were assessed as highly relevant. 
 
4.3 Derivation of crucial shortcomings of the corporate accelerator 
Based on the first results, we were able to derive which of the various areas of the 
corporate accelerator to focus on in our subsequent in-depth analysis. By following the 
logic that only areas of interest exhibit a high relevance level of participants on the one 
hand and a weak satisfaction level on the other, our in-depth analysis concentrates on 
“External Network corporate accelerator”, “Coaching / Mentoring” and “Collaboration 
parent company". Figure 1 illustrates this analysis step: Based on the results of section 
4.1 (satisfaction level) and 4.2 (significance level), we placed the various areas in a 
matrix depicting both dimensions. The figure illustrates the individual placement of each 
area within the matrix. The more an area is placed in the outer edge of the matrix, the 
stronger/weaker the significance and satisfaction level of the interview partners for the 
individual area. Thus, tendencies between the various areas in terms of satisfaction / 
significance level are also visible. Furthermore, we clustered the matrix in four distinct 
fields, enabling easier and faster interpretation. For the sake of clarity, the various 
positions of the eight areas within the figure should not be perceived as quantitative, 
clearly underpinned, fixed results, but rather as approximated interpretations of the 




Figure 1   Classifications of areas based on relevance and participant satisfaction 
 
Own illustration based on study results 
As the figure depicts, participants’ assessment of the area “Collaboration with corporate 
accelerator” was certainly relatively positive, but simultaneously exhibited only a low 
significance level. 
The area of “Demo Day” was assessed clearly negatively by the participants, but 
exhibited a low relevance for them anyway. In the area of “Collaboration with 
participants (current/alumni)” our results show a relatively mixed assessment (with a 
more negative than positive assessment), but a low relevance for the participants as well. 
 
The areas of “Equity Deal (money/capital)” and “Location / Office space” were the only 
two that were evaluated in a clearly positive manner by participants while 
simultaneously also exhibiting a high relevance. In other words, this is where the 
corporate accelerator performs very well in the eyes of the participants.  
 
A completely different picture can be drawn for the areas of “External network of 
corporate accelerator (e.g. to investors)”, “Collaboration with parent company” and 





























1) Good performance of corporate accelerator, 
but low relevance for participants
3) Good performance of corporate accelerator,
and high relevancefor partcipants
2) Bad performanceof corporate accelerator, 
and also low relevance for participants anyway
4) Bad performanceof corporate accelerator, 





















participants due to a high relevance on one side, but a clearly negative performance on 
the other. This led to our classification of these areas as crucial shortcomings - which 
were therefore supposed to be the objects of our in-depth analysis.  
 
For the sake of completeness, the area of “Demo Day” was also evaluated clearly 
negatively as well. However, due to its low-relevant component, we didn’t cover it in 
the remainder of this analysis.  
 
Finding 3: Based on the relevance/performance assessment, the areas of 
“Collaboration with parent company”, “Coaching / Mentoring” as well as 
“Network of accelerator” can be identified as the crucial shortcomings of the 
corporate accelerator. 
 
4.4 In-depth analysis of crucial shortcoming areas 
Within the identified crucial shortcoming areas, we focused on establishing which 
specific sub-aspects in these fields were not satisfying for the participants and in 
particular, why this was the case. Building upon our coding and following Gioia et al. 
(2013), we created an appropriate data structure for analysing our data systematically 
and transparently. This resulted in the following data structure, revealing participants’ 

















Varying commitment of  
parent company’s 
employees
Unclear strategy of 
parent company for 
corporate accelerator 
program
• Easy way to identify right person within parent 
company via intranet and other tools
• No problem to contact people within parent company 
due to corporate accelerator
• Easy set-up of meetings with middle management of 
parent company
• Involved people of parent company seem to be  busy 
enough with other topics
• Missing commitment of involved 
employees/managers of parent company
• No real follow-up of parent company after initial 
meeting
• Projects and communication don’t turn into real 
business and revenue after initial contact
• Frustration of participant caused by non-existing 
commitment of parent company
• Doubts of participants that parent company has clear 
strategy for corporate accelerator
• Impression that startups were chosen randomly 
• No strategic fit of startups to parent company
• Missing focus within portfolio of corporate 
accelerator
• Involved people from parent company had wrong 
assumptions of how to work with the startups
• Progress in projects on parent company’s side was 
was extremely slow 
• Impression that people of the parent company didn’t 
know the value of time for startups
• People of parent company seemed already very busy 
with daily business; additional corporate accelerator 
projects was too much to handle
• Impression that all decisions need to be approved in 
parent company’s headquarter
Complex decision 
making structures and 
lower speed in parent 
company
• Good training on how to present business case
• Too much focus on how to present business case
• Professional coaching structure
• Some useless coaching lessons within program
Imbalance of 
coaching content
• High-qualified coaches available for lessons
• No real benefit of some coaching for the participants
• Missing startup perspective of some coaches
Mixed quality of coaches
• No real challenging of business idea or product
• Coaches and mentors only giving soft and nice 
feedback 
• No critical questioning on bottlenecks or 
shortcomings of business model
• Coaches only give answers on specific questions 
instead of proactively questioning
• No long-term and continual supervision of business 
model development
Lack of in-depth 
challenging of business 
models
Coaching / Mentoring
• External network available and well nurtured by 
corporate accelerator
• Good access to late-stage investors
• External network limited to investors
• Network contacts sometimes limited to non-decision 
makers
• Late stage investor contacts not really useful for 
participants in early stage startup
• Limited access to business angels investors in network 
available for early stage financing
• Impression of participants that pitching in front of late 
stage VC is waste of time
Mixed quality and use of 
external network








As Figure 2 depicts, based on the 1st order concepts, we aggregated our 2nd order 
themes according to the identified crucial shortcomings into the dimensions of 
“Collaboration with parent company”, “Coaching / Mentoring” and “External network 
of corporate accelerator”. Appendix 1 lists representative quotes of our interview sample 
leading to our interpretations of second-order themes.  
 
4.4.1 Collaboration with parent company 
In terms of collaboration with the parent company, our data shows that only the initial 
access to key persons within the parent company was evaluated positively. Most of the 
participants confirmed that the corporate accelerator was a good door opener when 
approaching people within the parent company. In most cases, setting up initial meetings 
was not problematic for the participants. For example, the corporate accelerator helped 
them when international internal contacts within the parent company were needed for 
projects. Apart from introductions via email, the corporate accelerator also provided 
further matchmaking activities to bring the start-ups in contact with relevant people from 
the parent company. 
 
Several informants complained about the commitment of the involved employees of the 
parent. The participants often had the feeling in meetings that these employees did not 
have a strong motivation to really work on projects with the start-ups. Some even had 
the feeling that they were annoying them in the meetings and just wasting their time. In 
this context, the anticipated reasons of the participants went in several directions. On the 
one hand, the statements of the participants showed a high self-awareness. These 
participants presumed that the lack of commitment was due to the fact that the start-up 
simply couldn't offer a really interesting product or solution to the people of the parent 
company at this time. On the other hand, the participants also anticipated that the parent 
company were simply too busy with daily tasks to work on innovation projects with 
start-ups. Finally, there were also some that reasoned that the lack of commitment was 
simply due to the non-existent motivation of parent company to work with start-ups at 
all. Independent of their individual situations, participants complained about the fact 




business opportunity at the end. Even if initial meetings were successful, the 
collaboration or project goals were not achieved in most of the cases in our sample. 
 
Our interview partners stated that they had significant doubts that the corporate 
accelerator’s activities were built on a thoroughly well-structured and clear strategy of 
the parent company. Among other reasons, participants were missing a clear interaction 
structure between the parent company and corporate accelerator start-ups. Participants 
had the feeling that the parent company`s employees did not know much about the 
corporate accelerator initiative in general and how to interact with the start-ups at all. 
Moreover, many informants questioned not only the diversity of the start-ups within the 
corporate accelerator portfolio but also criticized the missing strategic fit between the 
business model of the start-up on the one side and the parent companies’ on the other. 
For some, this led to the question of which specific criteria the management of the 
corporate accelerator used to decide which of the start-up applicants are accepted to the 
programme:  
 
“On one side, of course, it’s a way to try things or to see how things are going, 
to see what works and what doesn’t work out. Fair enough. On the other side, 
however, they could also just have thought about the whole accelerator thing 
upfront before spending thousands of euros and renting an office in the centre of 
Munich.” 
 
The slow speed of the parent company, who are one of the biggest telecommunication 
companies worldwide, was a major problem for the participants. In this context, many 
of the participants emphasized their experience that the value of time differs 
significantly  between start-ups and the parent company. Whereas weekly project 
proceedings are important for the start-ups, the impression of the participants was that 
even a month long delay means nothing for the parent company. Even if initial meetings 
were successful, follow-ups to these meetings often took several weeks to months. 
Similar to the suspected reasons for the lack of commitment from the parent company’s 




reason for this slow speed. In addition, interviewees also suspected and criticized 
simultaneously that the decision making processes of the parent company represents the 
repeating showstopper in the different projects. Especially when the participants were 
approaching the parent company in terms of projects with international scopes, the 
processes took too much time. Several informants justified their criticisms by noting 
that their own financial resources were limited per se but especially chronically low in 
the weeks where the projects did not proceed. This reasoning was also linked to the fact 
that in most projects, the parent company only wanted to pay for them once the project 
goals were fully achieved - and not by milestones. 
 
Finding 3.1: The most significant shortcoming of the corporate accelerator in the area 
“Collaboration with parent company” was the highly varying commitment 
of the parent company’s employees while collaborating with the participants. 
Various projects were characterized by complex decision-making structures 
and the low speed of the parent company. In addition, participants did not 
see a clear strategy of the parent company for the accelerator initiative. 
 
4.4.2 Coaching and mentoring 
Regarding the coaching and mentoring activities of the corporate accelerator, the quality 
of the assigned coaches, as well as the general structure and content of the coaching 
lessons, were evaluated quite differently in our sample. In fact, although there were 
many voices stating that most of the assigned mentors, coaches, and coaching units fulfil 
their expectations, participants thought that the big picture of the coaching lessons was 
too limited to pitching skills: 
 
“I think, the focus was too much on building PowerPoint slides instead of 
thinking about customers and the development of a product. But I think, that’s 
not only the story of the accelerator but of the whole start-up scene.” 
 
Another outcome of our interviews was the participants’ call for better challenging of 




statements with a common wish for a highly committed mentor for the start-ups, 
individually advising and challenging participants in their activities and especially 
business development, without fearing inconveniences. 
 
One of the participants described this wish with the following words: 
 
“What was completely missing, was that you have the feeling they understand 
your idea, your product and the start-up business in general. That they dare to 
say to you “that’s bullshit. You have to change 50%. Your current way of doing 
is wrong.” But for this, you need persons with authority and expertise.” 
 
Finding 3.2: The most significant shortcoming in the area “Coaching / Mentoring” was 
the imbalance of coaching content. In addition, the lack of in-depth 
challenges to business models was also criticized heavily. 
 
4.4.3 External network activities of the corporate accelerator 
In the shortcoming area of “External network activities of the corporate accelerator”, the 
feedback was mixed. On one hand, the quality and especially the use of corporate 
accelerator’s external network was evaluated differently in our sample. Participants 
mostly confirmed that the corporate accelerator was successful in connecting the start-
ups with VC investor contacts. In terms of contacts to non-financing institutions as other 
corporates or advisers etc., the participant’s feedback was not positive. Here, 
participants saw clear limitations of the corporate accelerator’s network. In terms of 
investor contact quality, our data show that most participants think the corporate 
accelerator is addressing the wrong type of external investors in their activities. Often 
the participants had to talk to late-stage VC funds that were far away for them in terms 
of their own financing phase: 
 
“I would say that sometimes they did too much because, for example, they 




very later stage. So it was kind of good to know those guys, but for them, it wasn’t 
interesting to speak about the possibility of investment at that time.” 
 
Participants assume that the corporate accelerator would be better advised shifting their 
relationships more into the early stage VC / business angel field due to the better fit 
between the start-ups and investor therein.  
 
Finding 3.3: The most significant shortcoming of the corporate accelerator in the area 
“Network of accelerator (e.g. investors)” was the lack of fit between 
corporate accelerator’s investor contacts’ (later-stage) and participants’ 
actual development stage (early-stage). 
 
4.4.4 Summary of findings 
Our analysis identifies the three areas of “collaboration with parent company”, 
“coaching / mentoring” and “external network” as the most relevant shortcomings from 
the start-up perspective in the corporate accelerator. With in-depth analysis, we identify 
in detail which aspects are considered extremely negative and which serve as an 
improvement potential for corporates. Figure 3 provides an overview of the findings of 





Figure 3   Overview of the findings of all analysis steps 
 
 
Despite the shortcoming areas, the start-ups also see the potential of the corporate 
accelerator programme. One of the participants summarized his interview as follows: 
 
“The potential is great. It can be the most powerful accelerator in the world, 
because of the geographic presence and because of their access to Telefónica 
that is one of the largest corporates in the world. They were just missing the 




management should have more executive focus than just words. They have  great 
potential but they just didn’t execute well. They have a very good opportunity to 
do something great.” 
 
Based on this, the responsible persons, not only those from the corporate accelerator but 
- as our results show - especially those from the parent company, need to adapt processes 
and communication to exploit the full potential of the corporate accelerator initiative. 
The goal should be to provide an environment in which participants can flourish, and 
not conclude as this participant did: 
 
“We were going to Wayra because of Telefónica, and not because of the money. 
Then, Wayra gave us the money, and that was all." 
 
5 Discussion 
In order to stave off the “gale of creative destruction” (Hochberg, 2015, p.24), 
corporations need to gain access and get closer to innovation. The reasons why 
Telefónica, like many other incumbent corporations, engages with start-ups using a 
corporate accelerator is to “grow and manage portfolios of complementary start-ups to 
accelerate innovation and gain a competitive advantage” (Dempwolf et al., 2014, p. 22).  
However, our study indicates that corporate accelerator programmes have shortcomings 
that can lead to the failure of programmes, as the demands of the start-ups are not 
fulfilled. In fact, Telefónica recognized this and we have seen how Wayra abandoned 
its rather traditional corporate accelerator model in Germany and adapted a venture 
client approach in 2017. During our research for this study, four start-up teams have 
been running through the new venture client approach for the first time. Only the future 
will tell how the new model will perform and whether this adaption is only a regional 
phenomenon or whether it will spread on a global scale. 
Based on our analysis, we now discuss whether the new venture client approach 
addresses the shortcomings within the corporate accelerator programme that we 
identified. Pauwels et al. (2016) describe the design elements of a (corporate) accelerator 




relations). We agree that these elements are certainly relevant; however, taking the start-
up’s perspective, we show empirically that some elements are valued more than others. 
We follow Kohler (2016), who proposes that in order to "leverage start-ups’ innovation 
and to make corporate accelerators an effective part of a firm’s overall innovation 
strategy, managers need to systematically and thoughtfully consider the design 
dimensions of proposition, process, people, and place” (Kohler, 2016, p.1). Wayra's 
adaption of the venture client model brought changes within the proposition, process 
and people. 
5.1 Wayra's changes in 'proposition' 
Wayra optimized its proposition on three levels, namely (1) equity deal, (2) 
collaboration with the parent company and (3) strategic fit. 
First, Wayra evolved into a non-equity corporate accelerator. The funding structure in 
the former approach, especially the equity deal including the amount of capital received 
as well as the respective valuation of the company, was very well perceived in the past. 
The non-equity collaboration approach makes it easier for Wayra to accelerate 
innovation, practicing outside-in innovation by now focusing on rather later stage 
companies. An equity investment as a prerequisite for collaboration with those 
companies would be a constraining factor in the selection process.  
Second, Wayra sharpened its value proposition by offering direct access to Telefónica 
with a paid pilot and Telefónica as a venture client instead of more loose cooperation.  
Third, Wayra created a countermeasure to the identified shortcoming of a missing 
strategic fit between participants and the parent company. One key element of the new 
approach is the focus on business models being clearly linked to the strategy of the 
parent company in the selection of future participants.  
 
5.2 Wayra's changes in 'process' 
Wayra’s new management made procedural changes in the fields of the duration of the 
programme, the demo day, coaching and the collaboration level with the parent. Based 
on our analysis, changes should also be made in the area of decision making and the 





The duration of the programme is now split into two phases, with a pre-acceleration 
phase and three month project (followed by a potential long-term engagement with 
Wayra/Telefónica). This method of collaborating is better structured and linked to a 
clear collaborative outcome. The demo day reached a very low significance level in our 
analysis. Start-ups in a corporate accelerator already have a considerable number of 
matchmaking events and opportunities to engage with both the internal and external 
network of the corporate accelerator, thus the culmination in a demo day does not seem 
to add further value to the start-ups. Wayra recognized this and abolished the demo day 
in its new setup. We received rather mixed feedback on the coaching sessions. Wayra 
has now improved this with a welcome day which guarantees a well-structured 
onboarding experience and intensive tailor-made coaching. The process of collaboration 
with the parent, which was one of the main reasons for joining the accelerator in the first 
place, was clearly optimized, as noted in the proposition, with the commitment to a paid 
pilot within the programme. Moreover, both the complex decision making and the speed 
of collaboration with the parent company still seems to be an issue. The paid pilot may 
be a right step in reducing frustration on these topics within a corporate-start-up 
relationship, however, our analysis did not find any evidence that major changes have 
been made to improve on this. 
 
5.3 Wayra's changes in 'people' 
Clearly, a huge part of the identified shortcomings in our analysis can be linked to people 
and operational ineffectiveness within the collaboration. Wayra established a mentoring 
network with direct mentors from within Telefónica's business units (industry experts) 
and other founders in order to better help the start-ups in the programme. 
Both the changes in proposition and process will help to overcome some of the 
shortcomings of our analysis; however, we urge that two factors should be reconsidered: 
First, our data shows that the missing commitment of the parent company's employees 
is addressed only to some extent. Thoughtful incentive mechanisms in the parent 
company, enhanced internal communication as well as success stories may improve this. 
Second, within the Wayra team, someone needs to play the 'devil’s advocate', acting like 




5.4 Summary of discussion  
In summary, Wayra Germany is heading towards a new direction with its adaption of 
the venture client model. This concurs with Richter et al. (2018) who recommend that 
the corporate accelerator’s strategy should align the concrete innovation goals with 
resources, procedures, structures, roles, environment, and metrics. This new approach 
provides several appropriate answers in respect to our identified shortcomings as well 
as  significant potential and improvements in the way the parent company engages with 
start-ups. However, Wayra needs to prove whether this model leads to success in the 
long term - both from a start-up and corporate perspective.  
 
6 Managerial implications 
Overall, our findings provide practical lessons for managers of start-up collaboration 
initiatives on three levels and encourage them to revaluate the design parameters of their 
programmes. 
First, managers should be aware that start-ups see the highest value in collaborating with 
the parent company. Building upon this insight is key to having a competitive advantage 
over non-corporate accelerators. Neglecting to do this, as we have seen in our analysis, 
may lead to frustration on the start-up's side. In this sense, collaboration should go far 
beyond solely matchmaking and connecting start-ups to relevant stakeholders within the 
parent company. Furthermore, fruitful collaboration is characterized by strong 
commitment, easy access to decision makers, a fast-moving corporation, paid (pilot) 
projects and mutually beneficial relationships which lead to revenue and growth on both 
sides.  
 
Second, coaching and mentoring is well received by start-ups as long as they are tailor-
made to their needs and aims of accelerating rather than decelerating the growth 
trajectory of start-ups. Accelerator programmes are frequently organized in batches with 
the intent to organize start-ups in a similar stage and phase (Cohen and Hochberg, 2014). 
In reality, however, this is frequently not the case. Founders with different levels of 
experience and skills need specialised coaching lessons tailor-made to their current 




strings. Moreover, the role of what we coined 'the devil's advocate' needs to be present 
within the corporate accelerator - someone who pushes hard on the start-ups and offers 
in-depth challenges to the individual business model. 
 
Third, the external network of the corporate accelerator plays an important role for the 
start-ups, especially the relationship and matchmaking function to other investors. These 
investors, however, should be focused on the appropriate earlier financing stage of the 
start-ups in the corporate accelerator programme. 
 
7 Contribution to research 
Research on corporate accelerators has been framed within different fields of study, such 
as corporate entrepreneurship (Kohler, 2016), incubation models (Mian et al., 2016, 
Hausberg & Korreck, 2018) or open innovation (Weiblen and Chesbrough, 2015). In 
summary, the research contributions of our study are the following: 
 
First, while most prior research in the field of corporate accelerators describes the design 
elements of (corporate) accelerator programmes (Pauwels et al., 2016), or outlines key 
features and characteristics (Richter et al., 2018), the findings of our study fuel the 
current discussion within the field of corporate entrepreneurship (Hochberg, 2015; 
Kohler, 2016; Richter et al., 2018) and open innovation (Weiblen and Chesbrough, 
2015) on how to leverage a start-up’s innovation within the corporate context. We go 
beyond solely describing these elements by taking the start-up’s perspective and 
providing, to the best of our knowledge, the first study that empirically evaluates the 
shortcomings of a specific corporate accelerator programme. 
 
Second, our study provides novel insights into how corporate accelerators emerge. Thus, 
we contribute to research in incubation models, adding to Mian et al.’s (2016) discussion 
of how the concept of business incubation has experienced substantial evolution. We 
also extend the upcoming discussion of the new venture client model by empirically 
analysing one of the very first companies to apply this model after its introduction at the 




8 Limitations and suggestions for research 
Our research also has limitations. A single-site case study cannot provide holistic 
conclusions about shortcomings of the corporate accelerator model in general. We also 
do not claim that our analysis of the case under review can explain the evolution of 
corporate accelerators adopting the venture client approach in its entirety. However, as 
Wayra is one of the longest active corporate accelerators and to our best knowledge the 
first corporate accelerator that went from a rather traditional model to a venture client 
approach, our study is well suited to initiate a discussion on the shortcomings and the 
evolution of corporate accelerators, which offers avenues for further research.  
 
Clearly, our study is only a first step in understanding the shortcomings and more 
empirical work needs to be done to illustrate the evolutionary paths of corporate 
accelerators. Our case study relied on in-depth interviews with key informants that have 
been triangulated with additional data sources. Future research should also include 
interviews with different types of stakeholders which could extend the scope of this 
work beyond its start-up perspective. Nonetheless, the data gathered for this study offers 
significant insights into the current scope of work. Besides examining our findings with 
larger firm samples, we invite researchers to build on our insights and investigate more 
systematically the characteristics of the corporate venture client model, as well as the 
shortcomings of corporate accelerators in different regions and industries. Future 
research may find it valuable to pay further attention to the adoption process, providing 
deeper insights into how to evolve from a corporate accelerator to a venture client. 
Moreover, our findings should also serve as an impetus to investigate the environmental 
or contextual factors that trigger the adaption of a venture client approach. The main 
trigger in our case was the change of management due to the questionable performance 
of the corporate accelerator and the lack of joint business of the start-ups with the parent 
company in the past. 
 
9 Conclusion  
Our findings cast new light on the growing debate on corporate accelerators. From the 
start-up perspective, we derive what is satisfying, what is relevant and what corporates 




phenomenon of corporate accelerators. We conceptualize “collaboration with the parent 
company”, “coaching and mentoring” and “network of accelerator” as dominant 
shortcomings in such programmes for start-ups. By drawing out theoretical insights 
concerning these shortcomings of corporate accelerators in the light of the emergence 
of the venture client model, we pave the way for fruitful avenues of research. Our 
findings also encourage managers to re-evaluate the provided resources and services of 
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8 Contribution of dissertation 
This cumulative dissertation researches interactions between actors cooperating in 
innovation activities. Based on a primarily qualitative-driven general research approach, 
three studies are conducted in order to gain important knowledge on intentions, 
strategies and environments of the actors involved. Based on the fact that the three 
articles are not directly linked to each other, the specific contribution of each article 
should be described separately in the following. 
Contribution Paper 1:  
Previous private equity literature lacked to provide insights to investors’ value-add 
measures to portfolio companies in regards to innovation (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009; 
Gompers et al., 2016; Gompers, Kaplan, and Mukharlyamov, 2016). Therefore, the first 
article of this cumulative dissertation empirically explains investors’ behavior in this 
context. The results reveal a paradox describing a generally anticipated high importance 
of innovation from investors’ managerial perspective in contrast to few routinely 
implemented measures once being invested. Consequently, a change in investors’ 
behavior towards a more active approach concerning the innovation management of 
portfolio companies is considered to be profitable. In summary, results demonstrate the 
existence of numerous perceptions regarding the role of equity investment funds, as well 
as distinct approaches towards valuing and supporting innovation. While the selection 
of respective approaches to innovation is not exclusively determined by the type of the 
equity investment funds (Ughetto, 2010), the study however suggests a greater tendency 
of early-stage investment funds (venture capital and corporate venture capital funds) 
towards a focus on the technological and product-based aspects of innovation (product 
innovation). Later-stage investment funds (private equity funds and family offices), on 
the contrary, are seen to be rather concentrated on increases in productivity and 









Contribution Paper 2: 
Results of this second study correspond to the relevant literature including Cumming, 
Fleming, and Schwienbacher, (2006) or Nahata, Sonali, and Tandon (2014), among 
others. According to the findings, venture capital markets are characterized by 
significant differences in multiple dimensions between Europe and the USA. For 
instance, whereas Europe experienced 7 digital health exit transactions, the 
corresponding number in the USA is 71 for the analyzed period of this study. This 
amplifies the impression of an outperformed European venture capital market compared 
to its US counterpart (Cumming, Fleming, and Schwienbacher, 2006; Nahata, Sonali, 
and Tandon, 2014; Cumming and Walz, 2010). Nonetheless, the global surge of digital 
health ventures in the past years (Murray et al., 2016; Schweitzer and Synowiec, 2012) 
suggests a positive effect of digital health tools on healthcare anticipated by stakeholders 
in both regions. The findings of this study indicate that venture capital investors 
following this trend are rewarded with high multiples on their investments – future 
researchers are invited to monitor whether this trend will continue. 
Contribution Paper 3:  
The corporate accelerator literature primarily describes design elements (Pauwels et al., 
2016) and draws on key features and characteristics (Richter et al., 2018) of corporate 
accelerators. The third article of this cumulative dissertation enhances the body of 
literature in corporate entrepreneurship (Mian et al., 2016; Hausberg and Korreck, 2018; 
Kohler, 2016) in two ways: First, our research focuses on insights concerning the 
perspective of corporate accelerator participants, and second, provides an important 
view on the topic, which was had not been offered by the literature before. By pointing 
out specific shortcomings of Wayra’s corporate accelerator program, the study extends 
the research body with empirical evidence. Based on the results of our in-depth analysis, 
we not only describe high-level weaknesses of the program, but also deliver ideas for 
potential improvements. 
Based on the comparison between the old and the new Wayra corporate accelerator 
approach, covered in the last section of the article, we additionally describe the 




models and corporate entrepreneurship (Mian et al., 2016, Gimmy et al., 2017) is 





9 Limitations of dissertation 
Each of this cumulative dissertation’s articles faces independent limitations separately 
described in the individual article. Nonetheless, several limitations of the work presented 
in this publication-based dissertation need to be acknowledged and to be mentioned also 
from a more general perspective. 
First, it needs to be stated that this cumulative dissertation has a clear focus on empirical 
research. Exploring theoretical frameworks of the various interactions considered in the 
articles is not part of this cumulative dissertation.  
Further, this cumulative dissertation is primarily driven by qualitative data and research 
approaches with exploratory and interpretive character. Consequently, results are 
partially based on subjective perceptions of individuals. To validate results, quantitative 
analyses utilizing large datasets of objective measures are required.  
Finally, also underlying sample sizes of the studies conducted as well as the regional 





10 Future Research 
This cumulative dissertation encourages further research on a range of different topics. 
Each article separately outlines study-specific future research agendas.  
From a more general perspective, further research could build-up on the results of the 
studies conducted by validating qualitative results with quantitative data.  
In addition, future studies could also refer to the temporal context and investigate if 
intentions and interactions of actors vary over time. Future economic, social and 
political shocks or changes could additionally serve as a base for future studies as they 
could offer new investigation bases. 
Finally, future research could conduct similar studies in other parts of the world (i.e. 
Asia) in order to enable regional comparisons. Given the structural and cultural 
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